The target at Penn State was cocaine kingpin Agostino S. Abbatiello

September 2. 2026 marked the first court hearing for those who were allegedly part of a cocaine trafficking ring involving two Penn State fraternities, reported WHP-21.

Six of 14 defendants had hearings scheduled. Agostino S. Abbatiello was the only defendant in court wearing Department of Corrections-issued clothing the defendants in the Penn State Drug Ring preliminary hearings.  He was escorted by police into the courthouse. He was wearing a red jumpsuit and had handcuffs on. 

The reason: Abbatiello is the Penn State cocaine kingpin. All the others have cooperated with investigators, waived their preliminary hearing and three codefendant's testified against Abbatiello. 

At Abbatiello's preliminary hearing, Thomas Robinson was the first person called to the stand.

Robinson said he initially sold small amounts of cocaine, splitting profits with Huraibi. He said he stored cocaine in his room in the fraternity house.

Robinson said he later was in a Snapchat group chat with Abbatiello and Huraibi. He said they used Snapchat because messages are deleted after 24 hours.

Robinson described one time where he met with Abbatiello to purchase 250 grams of cocaine in February 2024. Robinson said Abbatiello came out and sat in Robinson's car to exchange cash for a shoebox of cocaine.

Robinson said later purchases were in larger amounts, including 500 grams and 1 kilogram.

Robinson said he sold mostly to members of his own fraternity, Delta Upsilon.

Mohammed Huraibi is second to the stand

Huraibi said he was introduced to Abbatiello via Snapchat.

Huraibi said he and Robinson purchased cocaine from Abbatiello. He said their first purchase together was in August 2023.

Huraibi said he later "decided I wanted to walk away from everything going on."

Huraibi said Abbatiello didn't sell to just anyone; they'd have to be "introduced" to him.

Huraibi said he used cocaine and other drugs after he started selling it. He said the drug use affected his ability to recall what occurred.

Lars Zeepvat is third to the stand

Zeepvat said he, Abbatiello and another friend "pooled" their money together to purchase cocaine from a distributor in Philadelphia.

Zeepvat said Abbatiello later found a cocaine plug from Long Island, which is when he "shifted."

"I saw a difference in Augie," Zeepvat said. "He started selling for money and popularity."

Zeepvat said he would later sell bags of cocaine. He was told, "You can keep a bag for yourself if you sell 4-5."

Zeepvat said "things really started picking up" during senior year. He believed Abbatiello was making more money because he was gambling, buying more clothes and selling larger quantities of cocaine.

Zeepvat said 3-12 people would go to after-parties at Abbatiello's apartment, where cocaine was out on the table.

When Abbatiello learned about the investigation into the ring on July 4, 2026, he allegedly told Zeepvat, "don't cooperate" with the grand jury investigation.

When Zeepvat did receive a letter to testify in front of the grand jury, he said he called Abbatiello. He said Abbatiello told him, "please don't say anything."

"There are lots of cocaine sources at Penn State," Zeepvat said. "When I was pledging (Sigma Chi), it was the seniors."

Bail

Abbatiello was initially denied bail, but his attorney argued that he should have the opportunity to get out on bail. His attorney argued that he's not a flight risk or a danger to the community. He said Abbatiello would live at his parents' home without any drugs or weapons.

The prosecution said hat he was trafficking drugs and "poison" into the community. The prosecutor said the judge was right to deny bail, but if it is granted, it should be set at $5 million.

The judge ultimately granted bail as $250,000 secured. Abbatiello is not allowed contact with any witnesses or any alcohol.

To read more CLICK HERE

Pa. High Court: Hearsay Evidence Not Enough to ID a Defendant at a Preliminary Hearing

Matthew T. Mangino
The Legal Intelligencer
July 2, 2024

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has yet again addressed the issue of proving a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing. The Supreme Court has clarified that inadmissible hearsay alone will not be adequate to identify a defendant at a preliminary hearing.

The high court initially sought to clarify when the commonwealth may properly use hearsay evidence to establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing in Commonwealth v. Ricker, 135 A.3d 175 (Pa. 2016), an appeal dismissed as improvidently grant, and in Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717 (Pa. 2022).

In 1990, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Commonwealth Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1990).

Prior to Verbonitz prosecutors could establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing by presenting only hearsay evidence. In Verbonitz, the only evidence offered by the commonwealth at the preliminary hearing was the testimony of a police officer about a statement made by a witness. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case. Justice Rolf Larsen wrote in a plurality opinion, “Fundamental due process requires that no adjudication be based solely on hearsay evidence.”

Twenty years after Verbonitz, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 542 was established and preliminary hearings were got a bit twisted. Subsection (E) provides as follows:

“Hearsay as provided by law shall be considered by the issuing authority in determining whether a prima facie case has been established. Hearsay evidence shall be sufficient to establish any element of an offense requiring proof of the ownership of, nonpermitted use of, damage to, or value of property.”

Rule 542 was established in 2011. It appeared that the new rule was intended to lessen the burden on prosecutors to call witnesses to prove “ownership of, nonpermitted use of, damage to, or value of property.”

However, the new rule’s comments appeared to imply that hearsay could be used to establish any element of a prima facie case. Prosecutors ran with that interpretation.

In 2013, the comment to Rule 542 was amended. The comment, as it reads today, provides “Hearsay, whether written or oral, may establish the elements of any offense. The presence of witnesses to establish these elements in not required at the preliminary hearing.”

In 2017, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled in Commonwealth v. McClelland, 165 A.3d 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017), in support of hearsay at a preliminary hearing, “admitting hearsay at the preliminary hearing would be irrelevant if the defendant was convicted at trial, and if the defendant was acquitted, then the error’s impact would be ‘minimal’ because there would be no permanent loss of liberty.” The logic employed by the Superior Court appeared to render the preliminary hearing meaningless.

Then in 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717 (Pa. 2020), which has come to be referred to as McClelland II.

In McClelland II, the Supreme Court had “little difficulty in stating with certainty that five justices in Verbonitz agreed a prima facia case cannot be established by hearsay evidence alone, and the common rationale among those Justices involved due process considerations.” The court held that hearsay evidence alone cannot establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing.

That bring us to the Supreme Court’s latest iteration of the preliminary hearing. On Jan. 3, 2022, the Superior Court decided Commonwealth v. Harris, 2022 Pa. Super. 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022).

Ronald Harris was accused of shooting a man over drugs. The victim failed to show up for two preliminary hearings. When the victim failed to show for a third hearing the district attorney’s office called the police officer who took a statement of the victim. The officer testified over the objection of Harris’ counsel. The case was bound to trial.

Although Harris filed a motion to quash the information, he remained incarcerated for nearly 18 months, despite the fact that the commonwealth had a witness unwilling to cooperate.

The Superior Court in Harris found that “Nothing in Rule 542 (E) prevents the application of Verbonitz requiring that all material elements of the criminal offense need to be proved at a preliminary hearing by nonhearsay evidence.”

The Superior Court concluded, “The Supreme Court’s holdings in Verbonitz and McClelland precludes the commonwealth from relying on hearsay alone at a preliminary hearing to establish a prima facie case that the defendant committed a crime.”

The Supreme Court permitted the commonwealth to appeal, by allowance, the Superior Court’s decision in Harris, Commonwealth v. Harris, No. 31 EAP 2022, decide May 13, 2024. The Supreme court narrowed its inquiry as to whether Rule 542 (E) permits the use of hearsay alone to prove the defendant’s identity.

The Supreme Court found that “Rule 542 (E)’s first sentence requires the preliminary hearing judge to consider hearsay in determining whether a prima facie case has been established … as to both the commission of a crime and the identity of the defendant.” The second sentence of 542 (E) is significant, it provides that hearsay shall be sufficient to prove “any element of an offense including, but not limited to. those requiring proof of ownership of, nonpermitted use of, damage to, or value of property.” The second sentence does not refer to identification. The court went on, “This strongly suggests hearsay relating to the identity of the offender is insufficient to prove a prima facie case under Rule 542.”

Although the Supreme Court did not approve of the rational of the Superior Court in Harris in all regard, the court was unequivocal in holding:

To summarize the state of the law regarding the use of hearsay at preliminary hearings, Rule 542 (E) is intended to allow some use of otherwise inadmissible hearsay by the commonwealth to establish a prima facie case that an offense has been committed.

Finally, we now hold, based on the plain language of Rule 542, that inadmissible hearsay alone may not be used to prove a prima facie case as to the defendant’s identity. This means the commonwealth at a preliminary hearing is required to produce some nonhearsay or admissible hearsay evidence to sustain its prima facie burden as to the defendant’s identity.

The Supreme Court has distinguished between the evidence needed to sustain a prima facia finding of the elements of an offense at a preliminary hearing and the identity of the alleged offender at the preliminary hearing.

Matthew T. Mangino is of counsel with Luxenberg, Garbett, Kelly and George and the former district attorney of Lawrence County. He is the author of “The Executioner’s Toll.” You can follow him on X @MatthewTMangino or contact him at mmangino@lgkg.com.

To read more CLICK HERE

PLW: Superior Court Panel Stresses Importance of Evidence at Preliminary Hearings

Matthew T. Mangino
The Legal Intelligencer
March 3, 2022

A recent Pennsylvania Superior Court panel has weighed in on the ongoing evolution of what evidence prosecutors need to sustain a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing.

A look back more than 30 years will help put into context the latest decision of the Superior Court. In 1990, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Commonwealth Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1990).

Prior to Verbonitz prosecutors could establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing by presenting only hearsay evidence. In Verbonitz, the only evidence offered by the commonwealth at the preliminary hearing was the testimony of a police officer about a statement made by a witness. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case. Justice Rolf Larsen wrote in a plurality opinion, “Fundamental due process requires that no adjudication be based solely on hearsay evidence.”

The importance of the preliminary hearing was firmly established by the U.S. Supreme Court through a series of decisions beginning with Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1(1970), which found that the preliminary hearing is a critical stage of a criminal case and requires the assistance of counsel. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the high court found that witness testimony and the opportunity for cross-examination are essential to pretrial matters.

In Pennsylvania, appellate decisions further expounded on the importance of the preliminary hearing. In Commonwealth v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), the Superior Court ruled that the use of only hearsay testimony fails to meet the threshold for evidence upon which the preliminary hearing judge may rely. In Commonwealth v. Nieves, 876 A.2d 423, (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), the court found that a prima facie case can be established by hearsay only when the prosecution provides other evidence in addition to hearsay.

Twenty years after Verbonitz, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 542 was established and preliminary hearings were got a bit twisted. Subsection (E) provides as follows:

“Hearsay as provided by law shall be considered by the issuing authority in determining     whether a prima facie case has been established. Hearsay evidence shall be sufficient to        establish any element of an offense requiring proof of the ownership of, non-permitted use of, damage to, or value of property.”

Rule 542 was established in 2011. It appeared that the new rule was intended to lessen the burden on prosecutors to call witnesses to prove “ownership of, nonpermitted use of, damage to, or value of property.”

However, the new rule’s comments appeared to imply that hearsay could be used to establish any element of a prima facie case. Prosecutors ran with that interpretation.

In 2013, the comment to Rule 542 was amended. The comment, as it reads today, provides “Hearsay, whether written or oral, may establish the elements of any offense. The presence of witnesses to establish these elements in not required at the preliminary hearing.”

The Pennsylvania appellate courts were then tasked with interpreting Rule 542. In Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) the Superior Court found “By the rule’s own terms, the panel found that hearsay evidence alone was enough for a prima facie case.” In 2017, the Superior Court ruled in Commonwealth v. McClelland, 165 A.3d 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017), in support of hearsay at a preliminary hearing, “admitting hearsay at the preliminary hearing would be irrelevant if the defendant was convicted at trial, and if the defendant was acquitted, then the error’s impact would be ‘minimal’ because there would be no permanent loss of liberty,” see Commonwealth v. Harris, 2022 Pa. Super. 1, at p. 9 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022). The logic employed by the Superior Court appeared to render the preliminary hearing meaningless.

After the decision in McClelland, the criminal preliminary hearing in Pennsylvania, at least for the moment, was of no practical use nor did it provide any meaningful protection to a defendant. In interpreting Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 542 (E) the Pennsylvania Superior Court authorized magisterial district judges to hold a defendant for court following a preliminary hearing at which the commonwealth presented only hearsay evidence. I wrote here in 2018, the preliminary hearing in Pennsylvania had been “eviscerated.”

Then in 2020, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. McClelland, 233 A.3d 717 (Pa. 2020) which has come to be referred to as McClelland II.

In McClelland II, the Supreme Court had “little difficulty in stating with certainty that five Justices in Verbonitz agreed a prima facia case cannot be established by hearsay evidence alone, and the common rationale among those justices involved due process considerations.” The court held that hearsay evidence alone cannot establish a prima facie case at a preliminary hearing.

Just as we flipped the calendar to 2022, the Superior Court further interpreted Rule 542. On Jan. 3, the Superior Court decided Commonwealth v. Harris, 2022 Pa. Super. 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2022). Ronald Harris was accused of shooting a man over drugs. The victim failed to show up for two preliminary hearings. When the victim failed to show for a third hearing the District Attorney’s Office called the police officer who took a statement of the victim. The officer testified over the objection of Harris’ counsel. The case was bound to trial.

Although Harris filed a motion to quash the information, he remained incarcerated for nearly 18 months, despite the fact that the commonwealth had a witness unwilling to cooperate.

The court in Harris found that “Nothing in Rule 542 (E) prevents the application of Verbonitz requiring that all material elements of the criminal offense need to be proved at a preliminary hearing by nonhearsay evidence.”

The court went on to say, “While a preliminary hearing is not a trial and due process is a flexible concept, the hearing is still a critical stage in the proceedings that is intended under Rule 542 to be more than a mere formality.”

The court continued, “We conclude that the Supreme Court’s holdings in Verbonitz and McClelland precludes the commonwealth from relying on hearsay alone at a preliminary hearing to establish a prima facie case that the defendant committed a crime.”

The Superior Court affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing the charges against Harris, and has provided some guidance for criminal law practitioners. The preliminary hearing has regained its status as a meaningful proceeding that provides, at least, limited protections for those accused of a crime.

Matthew T. Mangino is of counsel with Luxenberg, Garbett, Kelly and George and the former district attorney of Lawrence County. He is the author of “The Executioner’s Toll.” You can follow him on twitter @MatthewTMangino or contact him at mmangino@lgkg.com.

To visit the column CLICK HERE

PLW: Pa. Supreme Court to Decide Fate of Eviscerated Preliminary Hearing

Matthew T. Mangino

The Pennsylvania Law Weekly

May 17, 2018

The criminal preliminary hearing in Pennsylvania, at least for the time being, is of no practical use nor does it provide any meaningful protection to a defendant.

In interpreting Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 542 (E) the Pennsylvania Superior Court has authorized magisterial district judges to hold a defendant for court following a preliminary hearing at which the commonwealth presents only hearsay evidence.

Pursuant to Commonwealth v. Ricker, 120 A.3d 349 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015), and Commonwealth v. McClelland, 165 A.3d 19 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017), a prosecutor can call a police officer as its sole witness at a preliminary hearing, have her read her affidavit of probable cause into the record, and meet its burden of proof.

In Ricker, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that it does not violate the confrontation clause of Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, or the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for a defendant to be held for court and ordered to stand trial as a result of a preliminary hearing based on hearsay alone.

In June 2014, David Ricker shot Pennsylvania State Trooper Michael Trotta. Ricker was arrested and charged with attempted murder, assault of a law enforcement officer and aggravated assault.

At the preliminary hearing before a magisterial district judge, the commonwealth presented live testimony from an investigating officer, who testified that he observed Trotta’s gunshot wounds and participated in a search of Ricker’s residence.

The investigating officer spoke to Ricker in the hospital who said that he had an AK-47 rifle when he shot Trotta and commented that he did not understand why Trotta did not leave his property and obtain a search warrant.

At the preliminary hearing the prosecution played a recording of an interview with Trooper Trotta. Ricker’s lawyer demanded to cross-examine Trotta, and argued that Ricker’s case is being improperly evaluated on hearsay testimony alone. The commonwealth argued that they presented more than just hearsay evidence—they also presented Ricker’s statement.

Rule 542 (E), amended in 2013, provides: “Hearsay as provided by law shall be considered by the issuing authority in determining whether a prima facie case has been established. Hearsay evidence shall be sufficient to establish any element of an offense, including, but not limited to, those requiring proof of the ownership of, nonpermitted use of, damage to, or value of property.”

The Superior Court found that Rule 542 (E), permitting hearsay to be considered in assessing whether the commonwealth has met its burden, authorizes the use of hearsay alone at a preliminary hearing to satisfy the commonwealth’s entire burden of proof.

In McClelland, the Superior Court held that the 14th Amendment due process clause is not violated when a defendant is held for court at a preliminary hearing based on only hearsay testimony.

Donald McClelland was charged by the Pennsylvania State Police with sexually assaulting an 8-year-old girl. The charges included indecent assault, indecent exposure and corruption of a minor. The child was interviewed on videotape by a child advocate in the presence of a state trooper.

At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution did not call the 8-year-old alleged victim to testify or play the videotaped interview. The prosecution called only the trooper. The trooper testified entirely from his observations of the interview. The only evidence presented was hearsay.

McClelland filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus asking the Court of Common Pleas to review the preliminary hearing and dismiss the charges. The attorneys for McClelland argued that holding the charges for court based only on hearsay violated both their client’s right of confrontation and right to due process under both the Pennsylvania and U.S. constitutions.

The trial court denied the petition, and McClelland filed an interlocutory appeal to the Superior Court.

The Superior Court found that there is no constitutional right to a preliminary hearing, and therefore the prosecution cannot violate the defendant’s right to due process by asking a police officer to simply read into the record the statement of a witness.

Prior to Rule 542, Ricker and McClelland, there was Commonwealth Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172, 175 (Pa. 1990).

In Buchanan, the only evidence offered by the commonwealth at the preliminary hearing was the testimony of a police officer testifying about a statement made by a witness. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case. Justice Rolf Larsen wrote in a plurality opinion, “Fundamental due process requires that no adjudication be based solely on hearsay evidence.”

The importance of the preliminary hearing was firmly established by the U.S. Supreme Court through a series of decisions beginning with Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970), which found that the preliminary hearing is a critical stage of a criminal case and requires the assistance of counsel. In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975), the high court found that witness testimony and the opportunity for cross-examination are essential to pretrial matters.

In Commonwealth v. Carmody, 799 A.2d 143 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), the Superior Court ruled that the use of only hearsay testimony fails to meet the threshold for evidence upon which the preliminary hearing judge may rely. In Commonwealth v. Nieves, 876 A.2d 423, 427 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005), the court found that a prima facia case can be established by hearsay only when the prosecution provides other evidence in addition to hearsay.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed Ricker’s appeal on Sept. 28, 2017, as improvidently granted. While doing so, a dissenting statement and concurring statement clearly signaled that this issue is far from resolved.

Chief Justice Thomas G. Saylor, in a concurring statement, acknowledged, “I recognize that the applicable rules are not models of clarity, as, for example, the directive to accept hearsay evidence in Rule 542 (E) appears to clash with the rule-based right to cross-examine witnesses against the defendant conferred under Rule 542 (C).”

Saylor went on, “From my perspective, the 2013 amendment to the rule was not intended to convey that the commonwealth could meet its burden at a preliminary hearing entirely through hearsay evidence.”

“I personally operated on the belief that the court was not rejecting Commonwealth Buchanan v. Verbonitz, but rather, was simply putting the attendant controversy aside for future consideration in the case law,” said Saylor.

Justice David Wecht, in a dissenting statement, spent a great deal of time exploring the difference between “any” as used in Rule 542 and “all” as generally used. In addition he wrote, “when the law affords a hearing to a person involved in our judicial system, particularly a hearing in which that person’s liberty is at stake, the hearing must be more than a mere formality.” He then borrowed from U.S. Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardoza in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), “the hearing, moreover, must be a real one, not a sham or a pretense.”

Although in McClelland, the Superior Court acknowledged that the due process clause requires adequate notice, the opportunity to be heard, and the chance to defend oneself—it does not require the opportunity to confront witnesses against a defendant. However, Judge Mary Jane Bowes writing for the three-judge panel in McClelland did suggest some limitations on hearsay. She wrote, “This decision does not suggest that the commonwealth may satisfy it burden by presenting the testimony of a mouthpiece parroting multiple levels of rank hearsay.”

The use of rank hearsay is exactly what Ricker and McCelland have permitted. Although the Rules of Evidence have traditionally been relaxed at a preliminary hearing, permitting the prosecution to offer only hearsay evidence at such a hearing is, as Justice Benjamin Cardoza wrote, a “sham,” and a violation of the 14th Amendment due process and the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allowance to appeal to McClelland in January, refining the issue to “Whether the Superior Court panel failed to properly apply and follow the legal precedent set forth in Commonwealth Buchanan v. Verbonitz, 581 A.2d 172 (Pa. 1990), in which five justices held that ‘fundamental due process requires that no adjudication be based solely on hearsay evidence.’”

Matthew T. Mangino is of counsel with Luxenberg, Garbett, Kelly & George. His book “The Executioner’s Toll, 2010″ was released by McFarland Publishing. You can reach him at www.mattmangino.com and follow him on Twitter @MatthewTMangino.

To visit the column CLICK HERE