Jay Willis examines the eroding protections of Miranda v. Arizona for
The Appeal. Here is an excerpt from Willis' commentary: A few years later, the newly elected President Richard Nixon
set about the task of overhauling what was, to date, the most progressive
Supreme Court in history. Within his first three years in office, Nixon managed
to replace four of the Warren Court’s justices and installed a reliable
conservative, Warren Burger, as chief. The Court has not had a true liberal
majority since.
This increasingly reactionary Court quickly embraced the
spirit of the Miranda dissents. In 1971, the Court said in
Harris v. New York that
prosecutors could use illegally obtained confessions to discredit a defendant’s
testimony, even if they couldn’t use it as evidence of their guilt. For
example, if a murder suspect said before receiving the warning that he pulled
the trigger, and later blamed someone else, a prosecutor could tell the jury
about a confession that Miranda would otherwise keep out of the courtroom. “The
shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by
way of a defense,” Burger wrote.
Creating this loophole, said Justice William Brennan in
dissent, undid “much of the progress made in conforming police methods to the
Constitution.” “It is monstrous that courts should aid or abet the law-breaking
police officer,” he wrote.
Almost ten years later, the Court further weakened Miranda
in
Rhode Island v. Innis when
it clarified what counts as an “interrogation.” After Providence police
arrested Thomas Innis on suspicion of armed robbery, Innis said he wanted to
talk to an attorney. As a trio of officers drove him to the station, two of
them began talking—ostensibly just to one another—about the crime scene’s
proximity to a school for students with disabilities, musing about how terrible
it would be if kids were to find the missing shotgun first. (“God forbid,” one
said.) Innis, apparently overcome with anxiety, interrupted their conversation
and led them to the gun.
In court, Innis argued that this charade violated his
Miranda rights, since it took place despite his request for a lawyer. The
justices agreed that “interrogation” includes actions that police “should know
are reasonably likely” to elicit a response. Incredibly, however, they decided
that Innis was not “interrogated,” even under this seemingly broad definition.
Since the officers weren’t aware that Innis was “peculiarly susceptible” to
concerns for the safety of disabled children, the Court said, they couldn’t
have known their performance would prompt him to talk.
This is, as Justice Thurgood Marshall argued in dissent,
ludicrous. Appeals to “decency and honor” are common interrogation techniques,
and stage-whispering about small children dying by shotgun blast was more than
“reasonably likely” to get Innis to talk—it was a dramatic ploy designed to
accomplish that exact result. As Justice John Paul Stevens dryly noted in a
separate dissent, the decision basically gives police a green light to ignore
requests for lawyers, “so long as they are careful not to punctuate their
statements with question marks.”
Perhaps the most absurd Miranda cases weaponize the
warning’s first and most famous guarantee—the right to remain silent—against
suspects who try to invoke it. In the 2010 case of
Berghuis v. Thompkins,
police presented Van Chester Thompkins, a suspect in a murder, with a written
summary of his Miranda rights. Thompkins, perhaps wary of signing anything the
police asked him to, refused to sign a form to acknowledge that he understood
those rights, and offered only occasional, cursory responses during an
agonizingly lengthy interrogation that followed. One of the officers who
conducted the interview described it as “very, very one-sided,” and “nearly a monologue.”
Finally, after about two hours and 45 minutes of sporadic
yeses, nos, and head nods, an officer asked Thompkins if he ever prayed to God
for forgiveness for shooting the victim. Thompkins choked up, said “Yes,” and
looked away. Based in part on his purported admission, he was tried, convicted,
and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren had said that police must
stop asking questions if a person indicates “in any manner” a desire to remain silent.
In Thompkins, the Court flipped that principle on its head. Writing for the
five conservatives, Justice Anthony Kennedy explained that silence, by itself,
was not enough to invoke the right to remain silent; instead, suspects must
assert it “unambiguously.” He also decided that here, police reasonably
concluded that Thompkins’s one-word answer—after enduring nearly three hours of
one-sided questioning—indicated a desire to waive his rights.
This logic ignores the realities of race, class, and power that
were so important to Warren’s reasoning in Miranda. “Ample evidence has accrued
that criminal suspects often use equivocal or colloquial language in attempting
to invoke their right to silence,” Justice Sonia Sotomayor wrote in dissent;
they are in an unfamiliar environment, probably handcuffed, afraid of what
might happen if they don’t cooperate. Even if police insist they aren’t
technically under arrest, they may not feel they can actually leave, especially
if they are Black or Latinx. And even if they know about the Fifth Amendment’s
guarantees, they may not feel safe trying to bring them up, let alone in a
manner police deem sufficiently clear. Thompkins uses justifiable feelings of
powerlessness to render people, in fact, powerless.
The decision, Sotomayor warned, would encourage police to
“question a suspect at length—notwithstanding his persistent refusal to answer
questions—in the hope of eventually obtaining a single inculpatory response.”
She also pointed out the cruel irony of this standard: To exercise the right to
remain silent, the Supreme Court now requires you to speak.
In 2013, the Court extended the Thompkins logic even
further, holding in
Salinas v. Texas that
if a person who isn’t in custody doesn’t answer a police officer’s questions,
that silence can be used against him in court later unless he expressly invokes
his Miranda rights—rights that police haven’t even read to him yet. As Justice
Stephen Breyer put it in a frustrated dissent: “How can an individual who is
not a lawyer know that these particular words are legally magic?”
In response, Justice Samuel Alito argued in his majority
opinion that treating silence as an exercise of the right to silence would
“needlessly burden the Government’s interests in obtaining testimony and
prosecuting criminal activity.” But by instituting a police-friendly rule
instead, the Court made a deliberate choice to privilege the interests of
police over the interests of people under their control. When Justice Harlan
warned 47 years earlier that Miranda would endanger “society’s” welfare, his
definition of society plainly did not include the untold number of people who
would end up in jail because they were duped by police.
Underlying each of these cases is a consistent theme: the
justices’ faith in police to scrupulously follow rules and refrain from abusing
their power. There is little evidence that this trust is well-placed.
In the 1984
New York v. Quarles decision,
for example, police found a handcuffed suspect’s empty holster and asked him
where the gun was. Although officers hadn’t read Quarles his rights, the Court
decided that the gun and his statements about it could be used at trial. Under
the circumstances—as in Innis, a missing gun waiting to fall into the wrong
hands—the Court explained that complying with Miranda would put police in the
“untenable position” of choosing between protecting and serving on the one
hand, and safeguarding civil rights on the other.
For police, this creates a readily apparent, perverse
incentive: to ask questions before giving Miranda warnings in the name of
“public safety.” It allows them to cut constitutional corners based on the
supposed exigencies of the moment.
The Quarles majority acknowledged this concern, but just as
quickly waved it away, asserting that, more or less, everything will naturally
work itself out. “We think police officers can and will distinguish almost
instinctively between questions necessary to secure their own safety or the
safety of the public and questions designed solely to elicit testimonial
evidence,” wrote Justice William Rehnquist. This is an astoundingly credulous
assessment of the restraint of the police, an institution whose willingness to
resort to trickery, deception, and occasionally literal torture made the
Miranda warnings necessary in the first place.
In a sometimes-blistering dissent, Justice Marshall
excoriated the Quarles majority for subjecting the rule against coerced
confessions to a crude cost-benefit analysis. “The majority should not be
permitted to elude the [Fifth] Amendment’s absolute prohibition simply by
calculating special costs that arise when the public’s safety is at issue,” he
wrote.
Not every instance of official deception survives judicial
review. In 2004, the Court
struck down an
especially brazen procedure in which police would first ask questions, then
give Miranda warnings, and finally ask suspects to repeat the answers they had
just given—this time for the record. Writing for a four-justice plurality,
Justice David Souter referred to this strategy as one “adapted to undermine”
Miranda, and argued that no reasonable person would have understood they had a
choice about whether to talk.
But the impact of the Court’s war on Miranda is on the
millions of unseen interactions that take place in interrogation rooms and
squad cars—cases that will never make it to a courtroom, where a judge can
belatedly rescue a wronged person from the state’s abuse. By putting itself in
the shoes of police instead of the people harmed by police misconduct, the
Court tips the balance of power in the direction of law enforcement, punishing
people for not knowing what to say once the cuffs are on, unmoved by the
consequences of reflexively giving cops the benefit of the doubt. Letting
police push the envelope basically ensures that they will sometimes push too
far, and get away with it without anyone ever finding out.
Today’s Court looks nothing like the one that decided
Miranda: It is dominated by doctrinaire conservatives whose movement’s fondness
for law-and-order politics cannot be disentangled from their jurisprudence.
Justice Clarence Thomas, for example, is notorious for his indifference to the
plight of poor, incarcerated, or otherwise vulnerable people. In 1992, he
opined that
Louisiana prison guards’ brutal beating of a prisoner was not cruel and unusual
punishment because the injuries the man suffered weren’t “serious” enough. In a
1985 job application, Alito
boasted that
his interest in law stemmed from, in part, his “disagreement with Warren Court
decisions, particularly in the areas of criminal procedure,” among others. Now,
as a justice, he has the power to help peel back those decisions himself.
The justices’ collective work experience also informs this
Court’s anti-defendant bent. Perhaps the surest career path to becoming a
judge, other than being an officer in an Ivy League law school’s Federalist
Society chapter, is to work as a prosecutor first. This is not a partisan
phenomenon: Alito was the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey, while
Sotomayor spent several years as an assistant district attorney in New York
City. According to a 2019
study conducted
by the libertarian Cato Institute, 38.1 percent of surveyed federal judges came
to the job with prosecutorial experience. In lower federal courts, former
prosecutors outnumber former defense lawyers by a ratio of 4 to 1.
Not all prosecutors are the same, of course; in her
opinions, Sotomayor has consistently demonstrated far more empathy for
defendants than Alito and his fellow conservatives. But when ex-prosecutors are
so well-represented among the ranks of judges, it means that a disproportionate
number of people making decisions about defendants’ rights do so from the
perspective of someone for whom successful assertions of those rights were once
professionally inconvenient.
By contrast, no sitting justice has meaningful criminal defense
experience; Marshall, the last one who did, stepped down in 1991. “You’d be
hard-pressed to assemble nine lawyers in America who as a collective are
further removed from the realities of the facts of these cases than the nine
justices of the Supreme Court,” the Washington Post’s Radley Balko
wrote in
2015, in an assessment unaffected by the Court’s recent turnover. Attempts to
address this deficiency can make for easy fodder for law-and-order Republicans
looking to scuttle a nomination. When federal appeals court judge Jane Kelly
appeared on President Obama’s Supreme Court shortlist in 2016, a right-wing
activist group quickly
spent
a quarter-million dollars on ads smearing her for her prior work as a
public defender. In the United States, only one side of the criminal legal
system gets treated as working in the public interest.
The purpose of Miranda was, as Chief Justice Warren wrote,
to protect “human dignity,” ensuring that the existence of fundamental rights
did not depend on the legal acumen of the person exercising them. But the
Supreme Court has spent decades systematically hollowing out the decision’s
promise, even as the federal judiciary’s rightward shift made the legal system
less hospitable for criminal defendants. Today, only people who know their
Miranda rights—and exactly what to say and do to invoke them—can hope to enjoy
the protections they provide. Everyone else is on their own.
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