Legal Intelligencer--High Court: ARD Admission Is Not Considered a Prior Offense to Enhance Sentencing for a DUI

Matthew T. Mangino
The Legal Intelligencer
June 12, 2025

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3806 of the Motor Vehicle Code—which includes accelerated rehabilitation disposition (ARD) in the definition of a prior offense for purpose of sentencing on a second or subsequent driving under the influence conviction—unconstitutional.

The court found that ARD does not equate to a conviction because it lacks the procedural safeguards of a criminal trial, such as the right to a jury trial and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The high court’s decision finally puts to rest the evolving question of whether admission into the ARD program can be used as a sentence enhancement for purposes of deterring recidivist conduct on Pennsylvania’s roadways.

In May 2020, the Pennsylvania Superior Court turned the DUI statute on its head.

Igor Chichkin was charged with DUI in Philadelphia in 2017. Chichkin had a prior DUI charge in which he received ARD, a diversion program. Upon acceptance into the ARD program a defendant need not plead guilty or not guilty. If the defendant successfully completes the program the charges are dismissed and the defendant may seek the expungement of the charge.

Prior to the decision is Chichkin, if a defendant was arrested within 10 years of accepting ARD, he or she could be charged with a DUI second offense which carried a mandatory minimum of 30 days in jail, 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3804 (b) (2). For sentencing purposes in Pennsylvania an ARD was considered a prior offense, Section 3806 (a).

Chichkin went to trial on his new offense and was convicted of DUI. As a result of his prior ARD, he was sentenced to 30 days to six months in jail.

On appeal, Chichkin raised the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision of Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). The Alleyne court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused a right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury, which can only be accomplished if all of the facts that are elements of the crime are presented to the jury. If an element of the crime increases the mandatory minimum punishment, it must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.

Alleyne was an expansion of the high court's prior ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

Alleyne held "a defendant has due process rights to specific notice in the charging document and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as well as, the constitutional guarantee of a jury determination" with regard to "any factual determination that triggers a mandatory minimum sentence."

As a result, the court vacated Chichkin’s mandatory minimum sentence.

The court wrote about the prior offense excused by ARD, “They are a "fact" that, pursuant to Alleyne, Apprendi, and their progeny, must be presented to the fact finder and determined beyond a reasonable doubt before a trial court may impose a mandatory minimum sentence under Section 3804,” see Commonwealth v. Chichkin, 232 A.3d 959 (Pa. Super. 2020).

The Chichkin decision created chaos for prosecutors and the courts. However, that chaos was short lived. In fact, I anticipated the recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in an article for “The Legel Intelligencer” in January 2023. I wrote then, “The prosecution of repeat DUI offenders is back where it was prior to 2020 ... this is not the last we will hear on this subject. Stay tuned, this matter will most likely end up before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.”

How did this matter ultimately get to the high court? In Commonwealth v. Richards, 284 A.3d 214 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), and Commonwealth v. Moroz, 284 A.3d 227 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), the Superior Court held that, pursuant to Section 3806, a defendant’s previous acceptance of ARD for a DUI constitutes a prior offense for purposes of imposing a mandatory minimum sentence under Section 3804.

The court made it clear that the decision of a defendant to enter the ARD program is voluntary. A defendant “is free to reject participation in the program if he wishes to avail himself of his full panoply of constitutional rights.”

Applying for, and being accepted into, the ARD program does not carry the same procedural safeguards of a conviction following trial. The court found “The safeguards in place to be adequate.” The court emphasized that “Section 3806(a) appropriately notifies a defendant that earlier ARD acceptance will be considered a prior DUI offense for future sentencing purposes.” The voluntary nature of the ARD program mitigates the due process concerns expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. As a result, a defendant’s prior acceptance of ARD fits within the limited “prior conviction” exception set forth in Apprendi.

The Superior Court was unequivocal in its holding in Richards, “We expressly overrule Chichkin.”

On May 30, 2025, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Shifflett, No. 26 MAP 2024. In 2012, Shifflett was charged with the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol 75 Pa.C.S. Section 3802(d)(3). He was accepted into an ARD program.

In 2022, George Thomas Shifflett was arrested for another DUI and, based on his previous acceptance of ARD for his 2012 offense, he was charged with DUI as a second offense.

Shifflett pleaded guilty to the second DUI. At that time, the commonwealth asserted that, pursuant to Section 3806 the plea constituted a second DUI offense. The trial court agreed with Shifflett’s claim that the prior ARD should be considered a prior offense.

The commonwealth appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to treat the appellant’s 2012 offense as a prior offense under Section 3806 and impose an enhanced sentence under Section 3804 as a result of the decisions in Richards and Moroz holding that, pursuant to Section 3806, a defendant’s previous acceptance of ARD for a DUI constitutes a prior offense for purposes of imposing a mandatory minimum sentence under Section 3804.

According to the opinion in Shifflett, the trial court, in its opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, concluded that, in light of Richards and Moroz, it erred in granting the appellant’s motion to exclude at sentencing evidence of his previous acceptance of ARD for his 2012 offense, and, accordingly, requested that the Superior Court remand the case for resentencing. In a unanimous, unpublished memorandum opinion, the Superior Court vacated Shifflett’s judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear Shifflett’s appeal focusing on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne, and whether it was unconstitutional to consider Shifflett’s previous acceptance of ARD as a prior offense for sentencing purposes.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Justice Debra Todd, writing for a 4-3 majority, found “acceptance into an ARD program does not offer a defendant any of the constitutional safeguards that accompany either a criminal conviction or a guilty plea proceeding.”

The safeguards recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court’s in Apprendi and Alleyne, namely that any fact which increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt are not present with admission to ARD.

The high court continued, “Thus, an individual’s previous acceptance of ARD, which, when construed as a prior offense under Section 3806 to increase the penalty for a subsequent conviction pursuant to Section 3804, is a fact that must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The reasoning in Chichkin is again the law of the commonwealth. Once and for all, admission to ARD is not considered a prior offense for purposes of enhancing a driving under the influence sentence.

Matthew T. Mangino is of counsel with Luxenberg, Garbett, Kelly and George and the former district attorney of Lawrence County, Pennsylvania. He is the author of "The Executioner’s Toll." You can follow him on Bluesky @matthewmangino.bsky.social or contact him at mmangino@lgkg.com.

To visit The Legal Intelligence CLICK HERE

Michigan Supreme Court bans mandatory LWOP for 19-and 20-year-olds

The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that automatic life sentences without the possibility of parole for 19- and 20-year-old individuals convicted of murder are unconstitutional under state law, reported The Detroit Free Press. The ruling builds off a 2022 decision by the court to ban such sentences for 18-year-olds.

In a 5-2 majority opinion, Justice Elizabeth Welch wrote automatic sentences of life without parole for 19- and 20-year-olds with murder convictions violates the Michigan Constitution's ban against cruel and unusual punishment. Welch noted a 2022 Michigan Supreme Court ruling found similar sentences unconstitutional for 18-year-olds because late-adolescence cognitive development can still be taking place.

The ruling issued Thursday applied the interpretation to sentences of life without parole to 19- and 20-year-olds, who also similarly could still be experiencing cognitive development, Welch wrote. It also retroactively applies "to all relevant criminal cases," meaning a prisoner facing a sentence of life without parole for a murder that took place when they were 19 or 20 could ask a judge for a new sentence.

"Late adolescents who are 19- or 20-years-old, as a class, share with 18-year-olds the same mitigating characteristics of late-adolescent brain development," Welch wrote. She later added a sentence of life without parole "that does not allow for consideration of the mitigating factors of youth or the potential for rehabilitation is a grossly disproportionate punishment in violation."

A sentence of life without parole could still be possible, but 19- and 20-year-olds convicted of murder will now receive the same right to a hearing to determine if they can be sentenced to life without parole, currently in place for those 18 and younger.

Joining Welch in the majority were Justices Megan Cavanagh, Richard Bernstein, Kyra Harris Bolden and Kimberly Thomas. All five justices in the majority opinion were nominated by Democrats.

The court's two Republican-nominated justices, Chief Justice Elizabeth Clement and Justice Brian Zahra, dissented. In the dissent, Clement argued the severity of a first-degree murder conviction could be met with the most severe sentence possible.

To read more CLICK HERE

CREATORS: The Dubious Origin of "Three Strikes Law"

Matthew T. Mangino
CREATORS
March 11, 2025

The rising tide of urban violence during the 1980s and 1990s caused lawmakers to consider ways to up the ante for chronic offenders. In 1994, Congress enacted the former President Bill Clinton-backed Violent Crime and Control Law Enforcement Act. Part of the Act included a "three strikes" provision.

The federal three strikes statute, or habitual offender law, as it is sometimes referred, punishes a defendant with "mandatory life imprisonment if he or she is convicted in federal court of a 'serious violent felony' and has two or more prior convictions in federal or state courts, at least one of which is a 'serious violent felony.'

Many states followed the federal government. Today 28 of them have some form of three strikes laws. Many considered the habitual offender laws as an innovation in sentencing that would make neighbors safer. In fact, habitual offender laws were not innovative, they were dubious laws repackaged from an embarrassing era in American jurisprudence.

A new report from The Sentencing Project authored by Daniel Loehr entitled "The Eugenic Origins of Three Strikes Laws: How "Habitual Offender" Sentencing Laws Were Used as a Means of Sterilization" traces the connection between eugenics and three strikes laws.

"Habitual offender" laws first spread across the country in the early 1900s as part of the eugenics movement, which grew in the 1880s and reached its peak in the 1920s. The movement aimed to create a superior race to address social problems such as crime and disease, which, as Loehr suggested, the movement assumed had a biological basis.

Applying pseudoscience, laws and policies were created to prevent those who were deemed inferior, such as the mentally ill, those convicted of criminal offenses, or the physically frail, from reproducing, according to Loehr. Eugenics and racism are deeply entwined, as eugenics supported "racial nationalism and racial purity." One example of the relationship between race and eugenics is found in Nazi Germany, where "Nazi planners appropriated and incorporated eugenics as they implemented racial policy and genocide."

U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' opinion in Buck v. Bell — which upheld the sterilization of women in the state of Virginia — was even cited in defense of Nazi judges during the Nuremberg War Trials.

Carrie Buck became pregnant at age 16. Her foster parents had her institutionalized as a "feeble-minded moral delinquent," despite her claims that she had been assaulted by their nephew.

After she gave birth, Buck was sent to the Virginia State Colony for Epileptics and Feeble-Minded in Lynchburg, where her mother was already a resident.

Virginia had a law authorizing sterilization of, among others, the feeble-minded and the socially inadequate. With three generations available for examination, the colony set out to prove that the Buck women were defective. They sought to have Carrie Buck sterilized under the new law.

The Supreme Court supported Buck's sterilization by a vote of 8-1. Holmes' 1927 opinion is remembered as containing some of the most infamous language ever delivered by the high court — "Three generations of imbeciles are enough."

Three strikes laws reduce crime primarily through a theory of sentencing known as incapacitation. Proponents of incapacitation argue that an offender who is locked up cannot commit another crime while incarcerated. The longer the prison stay, the less opportunity to commit crime. Incapacitation is hard to argue against, especially when the person is a repeat offender. However, there is a downside to incapacitation.

Three strikes laws significantly increase the sentence length of a growing segment of prisoners, resulting in a growing and aging prison population. The fiscal impact of the measure has been significant at both the state and local levels.

According to Jacob Bush in an article in the Kentucky Law Journal entitled "Habitual Offenders Statues: A Need for Change" state expenditures for corrections went from $10.62 billion in 1987 to $80 billion in 2021.

States will face significantly higher future costs resulting from habitual offender laws as that population continues to grow and age. Tough-on-crime legislation, immigration crackdowns and promises of draconian sentencing practices continue to put a huge strain on an already overwhelmed criminal justice system.

Matthew T. Mangino is of counsel with Luxenberg, Garbett, Kelly & George P.C. His book The Executioner's Toll, 2010 was released by McFarland Publishing. You can reach him at www.mattmangino.com and follow him on Twitter @MatthewTMangino

To visit Creators CLICK HERE

The Sentencing Project examines connection between eugenics and habitual offender laws

Interesting report from The Sentencing Project, demonstrating the connection between draconian habitual offender sentencing schemes and the troubling eugenics movement of the late 19th and early 20th century.

“Habitual offender” laws first spread across the country in the early 1900s as part of the eugenics movement, which grew in the 1880s and reached its peak in the 1920s. The aim of the eugenics movement was to create a superior race in order to address social problems such as crime and disease, which the movement assumed had a biological basis. Applying pseudoscience, laws and policies were created to prevent those who were deemed inferior, such as the mentally ill, those convicted of criminal offenses, or the physically frail, from reproducing. Eugenics and racism are deeply entwined, and the “projects” of eugenics supported “racial nationalism and racial purity.” One example of the relationship between race and eugenics is found in Nazi Germany, where "Nazi planners appropriated and incorporated eugenics as they implemented racial policy and genocide.”

To read more CLICK HERE

Colorado voters to decide on increase length of sentences

Colorado voters will decide whether to force people convicted of certain so-called crimes of violence — like murder, assault and kidnapping — to serve out more of their prison sentences before they are eligible for parole, reported the Colorado Sun. 

Initiative 112, which qualified Thursday for the November ballot, would require anyone who commits those crimes after July 1, 2025, and is convicted, to serve 85% of their sentences before they are eligible for parole, up from 75%. It would also prevent them from being eligible for good-behavior or other reductions in their sentence until they have served 85% of their prison penalty. 

Other felony convictions that would be affected by the change are those for:

• Second-degree murder
• First-degree assault 
• First-degree kidnapping
• First- and second-degree sexual assault
• First-degree arson
• First-degree burglary
• Aggravated robbery

Initiative 112 would also make it so people convicted of those offenses committed after July 1, 2025, ineligible for parole if they have been twice-previously convicted of a crime of violence.

To make the ballot, supporters of the initiative had to collect signatures from roughly 125,000 Colorado voters.

To read more CLICK HERE

Study recommends enhancing judicial discretion in sentencing

PRESS RELEASE

Council on Criminal Justice
March 21, 2023

As cities across the nation grapple with effective responses to increases in violent crime, a task force co-chaired by former U.S. Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates and former U.S. Rep. Trey Gowdy today released a report outlining a comprehensive approach for the use of lengthy prison sentences in the United States. 

The report, How Long is Long Enough?, presents 14 recommendations to enhance judicial discretion in sentencing, promote individual and system accountability, reduce racial and ethnic disparities, better serve victims of crime, and increase public safety. Defining long sentences as prison terms of 10 years or longer, the panel’s proposals include:

• ·         Shifting savings from reductions in the use of long prison sentences to programs that prevent violence and address the trauma it causes individuals, families, and communities (Recommendation 1).
• ·         Allowing judges to consider all relevant facts and circumstances when imposing a long sentence, and requiring that sentencing enhancements based on criminal history are driven by individualized assessments of risk and other factors (Recommendations 6 and 8)
• ·         Providing selective “second look” sentence review opportunities and expanding access to sentence-reduction credits (Recommendations 11 and 12)
• ·         Focusing penalties in drug cases on a person’s role in a trafficking organization, rather than the amount of drug involved, (Recommendation 7)
• ·         Reducing recidivism by providing behavioral health services and other rehabilitative living conditions and opportunities in prison (Recommendations 3 and 13)
• ·         Strengthening services for all crime victims and survivors by enforcing victims’ rights, removing barriers to services, and creating restorative justice opportunities (Recommendations 2, 4, and 9)

“Some may wonder, why would we even discuss the nation’s use of long prison sentences now, amid a rise in homicide rates and legitimate public concern about public safety? Because this is exactly the time to examine what will actually make our communities safer and our system more just,” Yates and Gowdy said in a joint statement accompanying the report. “When crime rates increase, so do calls for stiffer sentencing, often without regard to the effectiveness or fairness of those sentences. Criminal justice policy should be based on facts and evidence, not rhetoric and emotion, and we should be laser-focused on strategies that make the most effective use of our limited resources.”

The report is the product of a year-long analysis by the nonpartisan Council on Criminal Justice (CCJ) Task Force on Long Sentences, which includes 16 members representing a broad range of experience and perspectives, from crime victims and survivors to formerly incarcerated people, prosecutors, defense attorneys, law enforcement, courts, and corrections. The panel examined the effects of long sentences on the criminal justice system and the populations it serves, including victims as well as people in prison, their families, and correctional staff. 

Drawing on sentencing data and research, including a series of reports prepared for the Task Force, the sweeping recommendations offer a comprehensive blueprint for action on a complex and polarizing topic. According to an updated analysis by CCJ, 63% of people in state prison in 2020 were serving a sentence of 10 or more years, up from 46% in 2005, a shift due largely to a decline in people serving shorter terms. During the same period, the gap between Black and White people receiving long terms widened, from half a percentage point to 4 percentage points. Though murder defendants were the most likely to receive a long sentence, drug offenses accounted for the largest share (20%) of those admitted to prison to serve 10 or more years.

“Our nation’s reliance on long sentences as a response to violence requires us to wrestle with highly challenging questions about the relationship between crime, punishment, and public safety,” Task Force Director John Maki said. “Through their painstaking deliberations, our members rose to the challenge and produced a set of recommendations that recognize our need to advance public safety while respecting the humanity of those most affected by long prison terms.”

To view the recommendations, as well as research briefs, meeting summaries, and additional perspectives shared by members, please visit the Task Force website. Participants on CCJ task forces are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation. 

Key Research Findings

To inform its deliberations, the Task Force commissioned and reviewed research on a wide range of topics, including:

• ·         The public safety impact of shortening lengthy prison sentences. Based on first-of-their-kind calculations, this research estimated that reducing long terms in Illinois (the state providing the data) would result in a very small increase in arrests of any kind, and almost none for violent or weapons offenses.
• ·         The impacts of long sentences on public safety. Summarizing the existing research on deterrence and incapacitation, the analysis finds that there are crime-reducing effects but that they are limited and vary by offense.
• ·         International comparisons. Researchers conducted original calculations to show that the U.S. remains a global outlier in its use of long prison sentences, even after accounting for the much higher homicide rate in the U.S., compared to Europe, and for actual prison time served (vs. sentence length).
• ·         Trends in the use of long prison sentences. Serving as a foundation for the Task Force’s work, this analysis shows how state prison admissions, the standing prison population, and releases changed from 2005 to 2019 and breaks down the trends by offense type, race, age, and sex.
• ·         Factors affecting time served in prison. Researchers examined how parole and other “back end” discretion decisions influence how long people actually serve behind bars.

·         Perspectives of crime victims, formerly incarcerated individuals, and their families. Through a series of interviews, victims and survivors offered their views on the role of long sentences in achieving accountability and justice.

t

More than half of the U.S. prison population is serving 10 years or longer

Amy Fettig and Steven Zeidman write in Time Magazine: 

There’s no question: Our legal system loves long prison sentences. From 2000 to 2019, the number of people serving sentences of 10 years or longer exploded from 587,000 to 773,000, according to a new report from The Sentencing Project. Those 773,000 people account for more than half of the U.S. prison population.

Extreme sentences have become so commonplace in the U.S. that 10 years can seem like a relatively minor punishment, perhaps woefully inadequate for serious offenses. But 10 years is an enormously long period of time – one in which people can experience profound growth, especially in their younger years.

That’s why we believe incarcerated people should have the opportunity to have their sentence re-evaluated after 10 years. In fact, the American Bar Association just passed a resolution recommending precisely that.

Make no mistake. This does not mean opening the prison doors for everyone after a decade. It just means giving incarcerated people the chance to show how they’ve changed and why they deserve a second look. An external body (a judge, for example) would then determine whether to reduce the sentence.

From a scientific perspective, this model makes a lot of sense. Everyone may know that young people are more likely to commit crimes than older people. But it’s important to know why. It’s largely because the prefrontal cortex – the part of the brain responsible for reasoning, problem-solving, and impulse control – does not fully develop until the mid-20s. So young people often exhibit immaturity, irresponsibility, recklessness, and susceptibility to negative influences and outside pressure – which the Supreme Court has recognized in cases involving extreme sentencing of youth. In 2010 in Graham v. Florida, for example, the Court wrote that because young people “have lessened culpability they are less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment.”

Think about it this way: Many people in their 30s would never dream of repeating the choices they made a decade earlier.

An overwhelming amount of research confirms that people age out of crime. It’s also clear that people released after decades of imprisonment rarely commit new crimes upon release, even those who had been convicted of the most serious crimes.

Revisiting sentences is not just about showing mercy; the entire community stands to benefit from the abundance of talent wasted behind bars. Many incarcerated people take classes, learn new skills, and earn degrees while in prison. Returning citizens often serve as credible messengers to guide at-risk youth, work as violence interrupters, and help promote public safety. They’re hard-working, tax-paying community members.

They also heal communities. Many incarcerated people have been separated from their children and aging parents for years or decades. Second looks can return fathers and mothers to support their sons and daughters, and sons and daughters to act as caregivers to aging parents.

Consider just one example of an incarcerated person who we know is truly deserving of a second chance. RC was 17 years old when an older man assaulted his friend during a dice game in New York. RC reacted by getting a gun and firing a shot that killed the man. At sentencing, the judge referred to RC as an irredeemable menace and in sentencing him to 25 years to life stated that RC should never again walk free. Ten years later, RC became a prison hospice worker, mobility aide, and sign language interpreter, revered by prisoners and staff alike. He languishes in prison with no mechanism for anyone to see the man he has become, one of many people we have met who would be an upstanding citizen outside prison bars.

Fortunately, momentum is growing to make that possible. In 2019, Sen. Cory Booker and Rep. Karen Bass introduced the Second Look Act to permit people who have served 10 years in federal prison to petition a court for resentencing. In the meantime, federal court judges are utilizing the First Step Act of 2018 – which made changes to compassionate release that enabled an unprecedented number of people serving long sentences to be re-sentenced during the pandemic. Washington, DC, allows those who committed crimes as emerging adults—under age 25—to petition for resentencing after 15 years of imprisonment. And states such as Oregon, Illinois, and California allow individuals serving lengthy sentences to demonstrate that they’ve earned an opportunity for another review.

We’ve changed an enormous amount as a society over the past decade. And yet, our legal system assumes that people can’t do the same. That needs to change. Let’s build on the momentum and ensure all incarcerated people get a second look after 10 years.

To read more CLICK HERE

 

Over half of all U.S. prisoners are serving sentences of 10 years or more

The Sentencing Project released an extensive analysis of the hundreds of thousands of Americans who have served 10 or more years behind bars. The report finds that in 2019, over half of the people in U.S. prisons – amounting to more than 770,000 people – were serving sentences of 10 years or longer. That’s a huge jump from 2000, when 587,000 people were serving such sentences. 

“Extreme sentences are so common in America that 10 years behind bars can seem like a relatively short imprisonment. But it’s an incredibly long period of time – one in which people can experience profound change. After a decade of imprisonment, many incarcerated people mature, take accountability for their actions, and acquire skills to support their successful re-entry,” explained Nazgol Ghandnoosh, Ph.D, Senior Research Analyst at The Sentencing Project and co-author of the report. “Unfortunately, people with excessive sentences are rarely given an opportunity to show how they have changed and have their sentences re-evaluated. That’s a major flaw in our legal system.”

Other key findings of the report – titled “How Many People Are Spending Over a Decade in Prison?” – include: 

In 2019, nearly one in five people in U.S. prisons – over 260,000 people – had already served at least 10 years. Back in 2000, just 133,000 people had served 10+ years. 

In 12 jurisdictions, two-thirds or more of the prison population were serving sentences of at least a decade – including Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, and Washington, D.C.

Racial disparities are stark among those serving longer sentences. In 2019, Black Americans represented 14 percent of the total U.S. population, 33 percent of the total prison population, and 46 percent of the prison population who had already served at least 10 years.

An abundance of criminological evidence shows that criminal careers typically end within about10 years, after which recidivism rates fall measurably.

Drawing on this research, the report makes a case for pragmatic and humane reforms, including giving incarcerated people the chance to have their sentence re-evaluated within 10 years. Importantly, this does not mean every person would be resentenced; it simply means people would have the opportunity to make their case before a court. In line with this reasoning, the American Bar Association – the largest voluntary association of lawyers in the world – just passed a resolution recommending that people receive precisely such resentencing opportunities.

The list of recommended reforms includes:  

•      Create an automatic judicial sentence-review process within a maximum of 10 years of imprisonment, with a rebuttable presumption of resentencing 
•    Bolster front-end sentencing reform by eliminating mandatory minimum sentences and changing prosecutorial practices 
•    Limit maximum prison terms to 20 years, except in rare cases
•    Increase investments in effective violence prevention and interventions outside of the criminal legal system

The full report is available here. 

Colorado governor reduces man's sentence by 100 years

Colorado Governor Jared Polis  reduced by 100 years the sentence of 26-year-old truck driver Rogel Aguilera-Mederos, whose brakes failed, resulting in four deaths. Originally sentenced to 110 years for an offense with no criminal intent, public outcry against Aguilera-Mederos’ harsh treatment prompted the governor’s and the district attorney’s offices to reconsider the sentence, reported Jurist.

Aguilera-Mederos was driving a lumber truck on a mountainous part of Interstate 70 when his brakes gave out as he travelled downhill. The truck ran into stopped traffic and burst into flames. He was charged with four counts of homicide and several counts of assault and reckless driving.

No criminal intent was alleged, but the resulting deaths elevated the accident to a “crime of violence,” triggering mandatory minimum sentencing enhancements. Under Colorado law, the facts required the judge to order the sentences to be served consecutively rather than concurrently. District Court Judge Bruce Jones stated at the sentencing hearing that he would not have handed down such an aggressive sentence if not for the mandatory minimums.

Five million people signed a petition calling for clemency. Kim Kardashian used her platform to call for reforms to the state’s mandatory minimum laws. In response to the backlash, District Attorney Alexis King filed for reconsideration which would have been heard on January 13 if not for Governor Polis’ grant of clemency. In his clemency letter, Polis spoke about “an urgency to remedy this unjust sentence and restore confidence in the uniformity and fairness of our criminal justice system.”

Polis also told Aguilera-Mederos:

Your highly unusual sentence highlights the lack of uniformity between sentences for similarly situated crimes, which is particularly true when individuals are charged with offenses that require mandatory minimum sentences. This case will hopefully spur an important conversation about sentencing laws, but any subsequent changes to the law would not retroactively impact your sentence, which is why I am granting you this limited commutation.

Aguilera-Mederos will now be parole eligible on December 30, 2026.

Also on Thursday, Governor Polis pardoned 1,351 people in Colorado who had been convicted of possessing two ounces or less of marijuana.

To read more CLICK HERE

SCOTUS narrows the federal Armed Career Criminal Act

The Supreme Court limited the scope of the federal Armed Career Criminal Act, which imposes enhanced sentences on repeat offenders with a past of violent felonies, wrote Robert Barnes of the Washington Post.

It was the court’s latest examination of the 1984 law, often criticized for vague wording, and it often splits the justices. It was  5-to-4 decision was no exception.

Conservative Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil M. Gorsuch joined the court’s three liberals to limit the reach of the law, which mandates a 15-year minimum sentence for possessing a gun if the person has been convicted of three or more violent felonies.

The question for the court was whether a conviction involving recklessness, as opposed to knowingly or intentionally harming another, counts as a “violent felony” to prompt the additional punishment.

Justice Elena Kagan, writing for a four-member plurality that included Gorsuch, said the text of the law makes clear it could not.

The law mandates that an offense qualifies if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” Kagan wrote, quoting the statute.

The phrase “use of physical force against the person of another,” she wrote, “demands that the perpetrator direct his action at, or target, another individual. Reckless conduct is not aimed in that prescribed manner.”

Thomas provided the fifth vote to sway the case for defendant Charles Borden Jr., although he did not join Kagan’s 23-page opinion. He said that just the phrase “use of physical force” was enough to convince him, as it did in a previous case, that recklessness did not count.

“A crime that can be committed through mere recklessness does not have as an element the ‘use of physical force’ because that phrase ‘has a well-understood meaning applying only to intentional acts designed to cause harm,’ ” Thomas wrote, quoting his previous opinion.

The decision could mean a lighter sentence for Borden, a felon who had a pistol when he was arrested in Tennessee in 2017.

Borden had three prior convictions of aggravated assault under Tennessee law, and prosecutors invoked the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) to boost Borden’s sentence. Borden claimed that because one of the convictions was for reckless aggravated assault, it did not count as a violent felony.

A district judge and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit disagreed. But other courts have found differently, prompting the Supreme Court’s review.

Kagan, joined by Gorsuch and Justices Stephen G. Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor, said Congress was careful in its wording to mandate the enhanced sentencing only for some.

“The treatment of reckless offenses as ‘violent felonies’ would impose large sentencing enhancements on individuals (for example, reckless drivers) far afield from the ‘armed career criminals’ ACCA addresses,” she wrote.

Kagan engaged in a spirited back-and-forth with Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh, who wrote for the other dissenters — Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Amy Coney Barrett.

“If an individual fires a gun recklessly at a house and injures someone inside, that individual has used force against the victim,” Kavanaugh wrote. “If an individual recklessly throws bricks off an overpass and kills a driver passing underneath, that individual has used force against the victim. . . . It defies common sense and the English language to suggest otherwise.”

Kavanaugh said it was true that Congress did not write the ACCA to “ensnare low-level or ordinary criminals.”

But “ACCA’s 15-year mandatory minimum sentence is triggered only after a defendant is convicted of not one, not two, but three violent felonies committed on separate occasions — and then proceeds to commit a fourth felony by unlawfully possessing firearms,” Kavanaugh wrote in his 38-page dissent.

“Such repeated violent conduct is not the stuff of low-level or ordinary criminals.”

The splintered decision and the strong emotions in the Kagan and Kavanaugh opinions might have delayed its resolution. It was the court’s oldest unresolved case of the term, argued Nov. 3.

The case is Borden v. United States.

To read more CLICK HERE

MCN/USATODAY NETWORK: ‘Goodbye and good luck’

Matthew T. Mangino
MCN/USATODAY NETWORK
May 24, 2021

Eight years ago I wrote my first column for what was GateHouse Media. Over those years, GateHouse expanded to include More Content Now and many more local newspapers. I have had the pleasure of writing 406 columns.

This is the end of the line - More Content Now ends its run this weekend. In this final column, I’d like to share with you what I’ve learned observing the criminal justice system over the years.

First, the criminal justice system is nuanced and complicated. It is also overused - from our schools to our homes and criminal statutes that don’t even require intent to get a conviction - people today are at the greatest risk in the history of this country to encounter the criminal justice system.

Unfortunately, there is little consistency in policy and lawmaking from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Unlike the medical profession where diagnostic and treatment procedures are very similar nationwide, no such national consensus exists in the criminal justice system.

This hodge-podge of lawmaking may be best exemplified by the death penalty. More than 23 states have abandoned the death penalty. Ten states never adopted state-sponsored death after 1976 in what has become known as the modern era of the death penalty. Since then, 13 more states have outlawed the death penalty and three states have in place moratoriums on executions.

Yet, the federal government which has the death penalty on the books, and hadn’t carried out and execution in 17 years prior to July 2020, executed 10 people right up to end of President Donald Trump’s term.

There are roughly 2,553 men and women on death row. In the last five years 91 people have been executed. The death penalty has become arbitrary in the way executions are carried out.

The militarization of the police has exploded into a serious problem in the United States. During the process of creating quasi-military police units, law enforcement officers have evolved from peacekeepers to warriors.

The mentality of “us vs. them” has created police officers who believe the end justifies the means. Claims of excessive force continue to rise; racial profiling is a statistical reality and police officers kill on average 1,000 civilians per year.

The murder of George Floyd by a Minneapolis police office ignited the nation, and world for that matter, in a movement to hold bad cops accountable. There are efforts underway in countless states to reform things like limited immunity, monetary bail and mandatory minimum sentences.

Qualified immunity provides the often ridiculous barriers that litigants must get through to bring a civil rights action against a police officer. Monetary bail is a growing problem. Many men and women sit in jail awaiting trial simply because they cannot afford bond. This scenario often puts defendants in the unenviable position of taking a plea or continuing to sit in jail. Finally, mandatory minimum sentences, relics from the “tough on crime” era, don’t reduce recidivism and precludes judges from imposing mitigating sentences based on individual facts and circumstances.

We all need to be vigilant in the fight to abandon the policies of a generation of “lock’em up” politicos whose agenda has had a horrific impact on juveniles - often, underprivileged juveniles of color.

The “lock’em up” crusade of the 1990s has been slowly unraveling. Dating back to 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Roper v. Simmons, outlawing the death penalty for juveniles, the Supreme Court has offered up a series of decisions limiting juvenile culpability. In Graham v. Florida, the court ruled that life without parole can only be imposed for a juvenile convicted of murder.

In Miller v. Alabama, the high court ruled states cannot sentence a juvenile to mandatory life without parole. In Montgomery v. Alabama the court went further and found that a trial judge may not sentence a juvenile to life without parole without a find of “incorrigibility.”

However, this past month, for the first time in 16 years the newly realigned U.S Supreme Court took a step backward on juvenile culpability. The court essentially reversed its finding in Montgomery and ruled that a judge need not find incorrigibility for a life sentence, the court judge need only consider sentences other than life without parole.

My admonishment to you: pay close attention. The tide may be turning in the judiciaries’ view of reform. Emphasizing punishment over rehabilitation will be bad news for those caught up in the criminal justice system and those who have to flip the tab - taxpayers.

Thanks for reading.

Matthew T. Mangino is of counsel with Luxenberg, Garbett, Kelly & George P.C. His book The Executioner’s Toll, 2010 was released by McFarland Publishing. You can reach him at www.mattmangino.com and follow him on Twitter @MatthewTMangino.

To visit the column CLICK HERE

New Jersey will review sentences imposed as mandatory minimums

While the governor and state legislators battle over a provision that would abolish mandatory minimum sentences for public corruption, the New Jersey Attorney General's Office effectively abolished mandatory minimums for six non-violent drug offenses, reported New Jersey.com.

The office debuted an online application where inmates serving mandatory minimum sentences for a handful of crimes can request a court review and new sentence, according to a statement from Attorney General Gurbir Grewal. 

The directive effectively takes mandatory minimum sentences "off the table," the statement said.

Applications are open to anyone serving a minimum sentence for the following violations:            

·         Maintaining or operating a facility that produces controlled dangerous substances
·         Manufacturing, distributing or dispensing a controlled dangerous substance
·         Employing a juvenile in a drug distribution operation
·         Distributing drugs within 1,000 feet of a school
·         Distributing drugs to juveniles or leading a narcotics trafficking network

Inmates convicted of most state crimes are eligible for parole after serving two-thirds of their sentence, the office said. But mandatory minimums disqualify inmates from that protocol, and impose prison terms that must be served for a specific number of years before parole is considered.

If the court believes a prisoner applying for a new sentence presents a significant public danger based on aggravating factors, a prosecutor can request a new mandatory minimum, but it must be shorter than the original minimum imposed, under the new policy.

To read more CLICK HERE

Report: Reform life without parole for second-degree murder

 Pennsylvania's Lt. Governor John Fetterman says the state's life without parole sentence for second-degree murder needs to be reformed, reported KDKA-AM.

“More than 1,000 people are sitting in jail right now on what amounts to a death sentence despite never having taken a life,” Fetterman said. “That’s not because a judge thought the sentence was deserved. It’s because a one-size-fits-all law makes it mandatory. Any reasonable person who looks at the unfairness of these sentences will acknowledge the need for change.”

Fetterman, who says the law ruins lives and costs taxpayers billions of dollars, cites a new study by Philadelphia Lawyers for Social Equity as confirmation that the law has to change.

The report states that "Unlike almost every other crime, second-degree murder – often called “felony murder” – does not describe an act but a situation: it applies when someone dies related to a felony. In Pennsylvania, that felony is defined as committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing from an act of robbery, burglary, kidnapping, rape, or arson."

In addition, the law is equally applied to anyone else involved in the crime, known as accomplices, no matter what role they played in the crime.

According to the report, it costs the state an average of just under $47,000 a year to house a prisoner in a state facility.

It's noted that an inmate incarcerated the longest on a second-degree murder convictions is a 73-year-old man whose sentence began in 1971. It's estimated that today date, it's cost the state $2.4 million to keep the man in prison.

The study also says age is a factor that should be taken into consideration. More than 73% of those convicted and serving a life sentence on second-degree murder were 25-years-old or younger.

The study says medical and behavioral science confirms that the brain continues developing into a person's mid-twenties and therefore younger individuals are less culpable, but serve the longest sentences than older individuals with mature brain development.

The report suggests that releasing these prisoners at age 50 could save the state near $1.4 billion.

State Attorney General Josh Shapiro also agrees that changes need to be made. In a release he said, “As a member of the Board of Pardons, I review the facts and circumstances of each case, and this report has provided valuable context for those deliberations,” Shapiro said. “The findings in this report also support the call I have made on the General Assembly to change the law so second-degree murder is not an automatic life sentence and to provide additional sentencing options, and I renew that call today."

The report concludes "While the mandatory nature of life without parole removed discretion at the time of sentencing, it is without question that the Board of Pardons, and the Governor, are vested by the Pennsylvania Constitution with the power to “override” the decision of the legislature in fixing the appropriate penalty for those who have been involved in felonies that resulted in someone’s death decades ago and are transformed people today. This report provides many instances that the Board of Pardons not only could properly exercise its discretion and recommend clemency, but should.

To read the full report CLICK HERE

The Legal: Pa. Superior Court Strikes Blow to DUI Sentencing Scheme

Matthew T. Mangino

The Legal Intelligencer

July 24, 2020

The Pennsylvania Superior Court recently changed the sentencing landscape for those facing prosecution for a second, or subsequent charge, of Driving Under the Influence. In Commonwealth v. Chichkin, 2020 Pa. Super. 121, No. 3473 EDA 2018 and Commonwealth v. Roche, 2020 Pa.Super. 121, No. 3475 EDA 2018, the Superior Court ruled the prior acceptance of accelerated rehabilitative disposition (ARD) does not qualify as a prior conviction for purposes of driving under the influence (DUI) sentencing.

Igor Chichkin was arrested and charged with DUI in Philadelphia for an incident that occurred during fall 2017. His case proceeded to trial in the Philadelphia Municipal Court in spring 2018, at which time he was found guilty of two counts of DUI-general impairment under 75 Pa.C.S. Section 3802 (a) (1), “An individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.”

A violation of Section 3802 (a) (1) is punishable by six months of probation and $300 fine. However, in 2013, Chichkin had been arrested for DUI and was accepted into the ARD program pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. Section 3807.

As a result, the court applied 75 Pa.C.S. Section 3804 (b) (2) (i) and imposed a mandatory minimum sentence of 30 days in jail because the current DUI was considered a second offense within 10 years.

The facts in Lisa Roche’s case were similar. She pleaded guilty in Philadelphia in 2018 and was sentenced to 30 days to four months because she had been admitted into the ARD program within the previous 10 years.

In both cases, the appellants argued that the application of a mandatory minimum sentence violated well-established decisions by Pennsylvania appellate courts and the U.S. Supreme Court.

In 1982, the Pennsylvania Superior Court ruled in Commonwealth v. Knepp, 453 A.2d 1016 (1982) admission into the ARD program is not considered a conviction for any purpose, other than the classification of the defendant as a recidivist.

For 38 years it has been clear that ARD is not a conviction. Defendants who enter the ARD program do not plead guilty. They apply to participate in the ARD program, admission is at the discretion of the district attorney. Once an applicant successfully completes the program he can apply for the expungement of their record.

Chichkin and Roche appealed their convictions to the Superior Court arguing the enhancement of their sentence based on a conviction for DUI within 10 years of a prior ARD is unconstitutional.

Relying on Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013) the appellants argued that in order to apply a mandatory minimum—without a trial or guilty plea on the prior offense—the commonwealth must prove the prior DUI beyond a reasonable doubt.

Allen Ryan Alleyne robbed a convenience store manager in Virginia. He was convicted of robbery and firearm possession by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.

At the time, carrying a firearm during a violent crime carried a mandatory minimum penalty of five years. If the defendant was found to have “brandished” the firearm during the crime the mandatory minimum would increase to seven years. The judge, not the jury, determined at sentencing that Alleyne had “probably” brandished the firearm during the robbery, and imposed the seven-year mandatory minimum.

Alleyne’s case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the opinion for a 5-4 majority. The court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury, which can only be accomplished if all of the facts that are elements of the crime are presented to the jury. If an element of the crime increases the mandatory minimum punishment, it must be submitted to the jury and found to be true beyond a reasonable doubt.

Alleyne is an extension of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) wherein the high court ruled criminal sentences cannot be enhanced above the limits provided by statute unless the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the specific aggravating factors giving rise to the enhancement.

Prior to Apprendi and Alleyne it was common in Pennsylvania drug prosecutions to enhance penalties without proving beyond a reasonable doubt the elements necessary to increase the sentence. For instance, the one-year enhancement for selling drugs within 1,000 feet of a school was determined by a judge not a jury. Having possession of a gun during a drug transaction or enhancing a sentence based on the volume of drugs were typically not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

In 2014, the Superior Court ruled in Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (2014) applying sentence enhancements or imposing mandatory minimums without a jury finding was unconstitutional. In 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 164 A.3d 1133 (2017), found the “1,000 feet of a school enhancement” unconstitutional. In order to enhance or impose a mandatory sentence, the trier of fact must make a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the conduct that increased the penalty.

As a result, a number of mandatory minimum sentencing statutes have been struck down, because they allowed judges to make findings by a preponderance of the evidence instead of requiring the elements be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Chichkin and Roche opinion authored by Judge Daniel D. McCaffery analogized the Apprendi and Alleyne decisions—which struck down mandatory minimum sentences—to 75 Pa.C.S. Section 3806 that allowed for a defendant to receive an increased DUI sentence for a second or subsequent DUI despite no finding of guilt on the first DUI.

There was an exception carved out for prior convictions in the holdings in Apprendi and Alleyne. A prior conviction stood for itself and did not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt when used to enhance a subsequent sentence. However, ARD is not a prior conviction.

McCaffrey wrote, “We conclude the appellant’s acceptances of ARD cannot be categorized as ‘prior convictions’ exempt from the holding of Apprendi and Alleyne.”

Following this reasoning it is unconstitutional to apply heightened DUI penalties to individuals whose prior cases have not been subject to an admission or a verdict of guilt following trial. The Superior Court further reasoned that the purpose of the ARD program is not to convict the defendant but rather offer rehabilitation, treatment and a clean start. Therefore, the mere acceptance of ARD is not the same as a conviction.

In Chichkin and Roche, “The commonwealth seeks to label appellants as ‘recidivist drunk drivers’ based solely on their prior acceptances of ARD.”

McCaffery concluded, “75 Pa.C.S. Section 3806 (a), which defines a prior acceptance of ARD in a DUI case as a ‘prior offense’ for DUI sentencing enhancement purposes, offends the due process clause and is therefore unconstitutional.”

As a result, what was once a second offense is now a “second-first offense” for purposes of DUI sentencing. That alone will have a significant impact on those who come before the court after re-offending. In addition, for those who have already come before the court and have been sentenced as recidivist this decision may open the door to post-conviction relief. Expect a spike in petitions from those sentenced on second, third or subsequent DUI offenses who remain in jail, on parole or serving a term of probation.

Matthew T. Mangino is of counsel with Luxenberg, Garbett, Kelly & George in New Castle. His weekly column on crime and punishment is syndicated by GateHouse Media. He is the author of The Executioner’s Toll, 2010. You can reach him at www.mattmangino.com and follow him on Twitter @MatthewTMangino.

To visit the column CLICK HERE

The Appeal: Death by incarceration in Pennsylvania

Yesterday, the Philadelphia Inquirer editorial board looked at two overlapping injustices in Pennsylvania: the large number of people sentenced to die in prison and the use of this sentence against people who are considered accomplices to a crime but did not kill anyone and are convicted of felony murder. It also discussed a mechanism for addressing these problems: the state’s clemency process, sidelined for decades but now experiencing a revival through the leadership of Lt. Gov. John Fetterman, writes Vaidya Gullapalli of The Appeal.

A sentence of life in prison is an extreme punishment, yet these sentences are common in the United States. The Sentencing Project has found that 1 in 7 people in prison in the U.S. are serving a life sentence or what, by virtue of sentence length, is its equivalent. There are more people sentenced to die in prison than there were people in prison in the early 1970s.

Pennsylvania is one of the worst U.S. states on the matter of life without parole sentences. There are more than 5,300 people in prison for life in the state. (In absolute numbers, only Florida has more people in prison for life.) These sentences have been incredibly concentrated, with more than half of those people sentenced in Philadelphia. And while life without parole sentences have been used disproportionately against Black and Latinx people across the country, Pennsylvania is even worse than the national average on this measure.

These numbers are the product of the tough-on-crime sentencing laws that swept the nation in the ’80s. In commentary for the Inquirer in January, Ashley Nellis of the Sentencing Project and co-author of “The Meaning of Life: The Case for Abolishing Life Sentences,” identified three sets of laws that contribute to Pennsylvania’s flood of life sentences. First, a life sentence in Pennsylvania is automatically a life without parole sentence. (It is one of only five states where parole is not available for anyone sentenced to life in prison.) Second, life sentences are automatic for anyone convicted of first- or second-degree murder. This includes felony murder, in which a person who is considered an accomplice to murder but did not kill anyone, which is second-degree murder. Finally, the state charges children as young as 14 as adults, resulting in, as Nellis wrote, “the nation’s—and the world’s—largest population of lifers who were juveniles at the time of their offense.”

The problem has been clear for some time. State lawmakers have introduced bills to restore parole eligibility for some people sentenced to life in prison. There have also been legislative efforts to address the injustice of felony murder sentencing. These bills have not yet passed in the legislature.

At the local level, in Philadelphia at least, there has been an attempt to correct the practice of overcharging that contributed to so many people being sentenced to death in prison. For too long, at the local level, district attorneys have used harsh sentences as a tool to extract pleas and have made bringing the highest charges possible the default. These charging decisions, made by prosecutors with full information about sentence lengths (unlike jurors, who lack this information at trial), make extremely long sentences the norm. Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner is trying to change this, introducing a policy of carefully considering the full spectrum of charges available in homicide cases and evaluating which is most appropriate on a case-by-case basis.

These necessary efforts all address the front-end and the flow into the prison system. But as is the case nationally, it is important to couple these efforts with mechanisms to release the people who are already in prison. In Pennsylvania, Lt. Gov. Fetterman, chairperson of the state Board of Pardons, has made restarting the clemency process, including for people convicted of violent crimes, a priority. Since Governor Tom Wolf took office, he has granted commutations to 11 people who had been sentenced to die in prison. In September, the Pennsylvania Board of Pardons recommended commutations for nine people in prison for life. In Philadelphia, the DA’s office Conviction Review Unit examines cases for unjust sentencing as well as wrongful convictions.

The work to address Pennsylvania’s incarceration system has been underway for a long time. The movements that propelled Krasner to Philadelphia DA have also envisioned the review of extreme sentences. People who have lost loved ones both to homicides and to the prison system have described themselves as “dual victims” and called for an end to life without parole sentences.

Last year, the Philadelphia-based Abolitionist Law Center issued a report on life without parole sentences in Pennsylvania and recommendations for ending the practice.

“The situation of permanent imprisonment for more than 5,300 people in Pennsylvania is untenable,” the authors wrote. “It does not have to be this way. In the vast majority of the world, it is not. DBI [death by incarceration] sentences are another peculiarly U.S.-based phenomenon. Around much of the world such sentences are not permitted, and where they are they are not imposed at anywhere near the levels that they are imposed in this country. The racial demographics of DBI sentences are a scandal and a human rights travesty.”

And these sentences do not just affect people in prison. They afflict families and cripple communities. “The consequences of DBI sentencing extend far beyond the prison walls,” the authors continued. “The total absence of redemptive opportunity hardens punitive attitudes in society by legitimating the most destructive and divisive impulses within people: fear, vengeance, racism, and cruelty.”

To fight to end death by incarceration sentences, they wrote, is also to fight for a society ordered around different values. “Ultimately, the fight to abolish DBI sentences is a fight over what type of society we want to live in, whether we will organize around values of restoration and redemption and healing or continue down the path of fear and stigma and vengeance. The fight is about how much injustice people will tolerate from the government.”

To read more CLICK HERE