On Friday, May 15, President Trump
announced in
a letter to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi that he was firing State
Department Inspector General Steve Linick.
Several sources have
reported that Stephen Akard, the Senate-confirmed director of the State
Department’s
Office of Foreign
Missions, will replace Linick in an acting capacity. Trump’s firing of
Linick is almost certainly lawful. However, it is unclear whether Trump can
immediately replace Linick with Akard, if that is the plan, according to a
Lawfare.com column by Jack Goldsmith and Ben Miller-Gootnik.
1. Is the Firing Lawful?
Bracketing for a moment the question of retaliation, which
we discuss briefly below, Trump’s firing of Linick appears to be lawful. The
State Department inspector general is governed by the Inspector General Act of
1978, as modified by the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 (IGRA). The
amended statute
states that
an inspector general “may be removed from office by the President” but requires
the president to “communicate in writing” to both houses of Congress “the
reasons for any such removal” at least 30 days before the removal. The reason
that Trump provided for the removal in his
letter to
Pelosi was that he “no longer” had the “fullest confidence” in Linick. This was
the exact reason and language Trump used when he
fired Michael
Atkinson as inspector general of the intelligence community in April.
It is also the precise reason and language that President
Barack Obama used in 2009 when he
fired Gerald
Walpin as inspector general of the Corporation for National and Community
Service (CNCS), though the Obama White House within a week after the
termination provided
detailed
reasons for the firing. After Obama fired Walpin, Walpin sued the CNCS
for reinstatement. The federal district court in 2010
rejected
Walpin’s request for mandamus relief on the grounds that he lacked a
cause of action. Part of Judge Richard Roberts’s reasoning was that in
complaining “that the President’s rationale [for the firing] was insufficient,
Walpin fails to show how the [Inspector General Act] provides any sort of
criteria that would allow a court to make that determination.” The court also
noted that the
Senate
report accompanying the IGRA indicated that Congress rejected a higher
“for cause” removal standard, hoped that the notice provision alone would deter
improper firings, and stated that the notice provision “does not alter the
President’s ultimate authorities with respect to Executive Branch employees.”
In short, the standard for firing the State Department
inspector general is a low one, and Trump’s thin reason almost certainly
suffices—especially against the background of the president’s constitutional
authority to fire presidential appointees at will absent a statutory provision
to the contrary.
This conclusion does not extend to potential legal
constraints related to the
possibility that
Linick was fired in retaliation for investigating Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo. The State Department inspector general statute, at
22
U.S.C. § 3929(a), specifies that “[n]either the Secretary of State nor any
other officer of the Department shall prevent or prohibit the Inspector General
from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation, or
from issuing any subpoena during the course of any audit or investigation.”
This may have been the provision that Rep. Eliot Engel and Sen. Bob Menendez
had in mind when they
stated that
Linick’s firing “may be an illegal act of retaliation.” It is unclear how
§ 3929(a) intersects
with the termination provision of the inspector general statute, and in any
event the statute limits the secretary of state and not the president. But
Pompeo’s reported recommendation to fire Linick, if substantiated, may
implicate the State Department inspector general statute independent of the
legality of firing itself.
2. Can President Trump Place Linick on Administrative
Leave?
The IGRA
requires notice
to Congress “30 days before the removal.” This implies that Linick
must remain State Department inspector general for almost a month longer.
One partial way around this conclusion would be for Trump to
place Linick on administrative leave during that period prior to his formal
termination and thus effectively (even if not technically) remove him from
office immediately. That is what Trump
did with
Atkinson in April. It is what the State Department spokesperson might have
implied when he or she recently
said that
Akard “will now lead the Office of the Inspector General at the State
Department.” And it is also what Obama did with Walpin in 2009. According
to
Walpin (page
2) and a Republican staff
report on
the Walpin firing (page 44), Walpin was placed on administrative leave
immediately upon notice of the termination and not permitted to return to his
office.
At first glance, the placement of a terminated inspector
general on administrative leave for the 30-day period appears to violate the
statutory requirement of notice to Congress 30 days before removal. But in the
2010 Walpin decision, Roberts provided reasons why this move may not
violate the 30-day rule. He explained that the
IGRA states
that “[n]othing in this subsection shall prohibit a personnel action otherwise
authorized by law, other than transfer or removal.” He noted that Office of
Personnel Management
regulations on
civil service employment define “removal” as “the involuntary separation of an
employee from employment with an agency.” And he noted that
courts had
ruled—in
contexts not concerning an inspector general—that placing an employee on
administrative leave did not amount to removal. For these reasons, placing a
terminated inspector general on administrative leave during the 30-day period
is not a “removal” and thus does not violate the inspector general statute’s
notice requirement. (The House’s latest coronavirus relief
bill seeks
to address this issue by adding the placement of an inspector general on “paid
or unpaid non-duty status” to the list of personnel changes that require
congressional notification 30 days before taking effect.)
In sum, it appears that the IGRA prohibits the Trump
administration from formally terminating Linick for almost a month. If Linick
is placed on administrative leave, that can be construed to be consistent with
the statute’s 30-day rule on the ground that the leave technically does not
constitute removal. This conclusion raises separate issues for Trump’s apparent
replacement of Linick with Akard.
3. Can Akard Replace Linick Immediately?
A State Department spokesperson
said that
Akard would replace Linick and become acting inspector general “now,” which
implies immediate replacement. But as of this writing it remains unclear
whether Akard will assume the acting position immediately or after the 30-day
period. There is a recent precedent, however. When Trump fired Atkinson from
the intelligence community inspector general slot in April, he
replaced
him immediately with Thomas Monheim, who at the time was the general
counsel of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. If something similar
happens here, would it be lawful?
The answer turns on the intersection of the IGRA and the
Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA), and is complicated—too complicated to sort
out definitively here. But here are the issues.
Recall that to make it possible for Linick to be placed on
administrative leave for 30 days consistent with the 30-day notice requirement
of the IGRA, we probably need to conclude that Linick has not been removed from
his inspector general position for 30 days. Considered alone, that would seem
to make it impossible for Akard to replace him during that period, since the
slot has technically not been vacated.
But the FVRA has different criteria for when an office is
vacant and can be filled. It
allows a
president to fill Senate-confirmed positions with certain defined persons when
the person confirmed for the position “dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to
perform the functions and duties of the office.” Akard satisfies one of the
defined replacement criteria—he was confirmed by the Senate for a different
slot. But is Linick “otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the
office”?
We have found no case law on the question of whether someone
on administrative leave is unable to perform the functions and duties of the
office for purposes of the FVRA. For a “normal” administrative leave for
sickness or temporary absence, the answer is probably yes. The reason is that
the FVRA likely covers both temporary and permanent vacancies, as the Office of
Legal Counsel ruled in a
2017
memo. That interpretation seems sound. The preceding Vacancies Act
explicitly listed “sickness” as one of the conditions under which the president
could temporarily fill a vacant office, and the FVRA’s
legislative
history indicates that
the FVRA was only intended to expand that act’s reach. As a result, it seems likely
that the temporary nature of administrative leave by itself poses no bar to an
FVRA appointment.
Whether an imposed administrative leave following a
notification of presidential firing counts as a vacancy under the FVRA turns on
the
much-mooted question of
whether someone fired by the president is “unable” to serve under the FVRA and
thus can be replaced under the statute. The Office of Legal Counsel has
taken the position that
a presidential firing implicates the FVRA and allows the president to replace
the fired officer. The Office of Legal Counsel’s main arguments are that the
bill’s sponsor suggested on the Senate floor that the FVRA would reach firings
and that “troubling” practical consequences would result if it did not. At
least one federal district
court has
disagreed with this interpretation in dicta, and
one of us recently
argued that the Office of Legal Counsel’s view is wrong because it
misinterprets the act’s legislative history, improperly reads its text and
structure, and overlooks its historical context.
But even assuming the Office of Legal Counsel is right,
there is still the question in the present context of how to reconcile its
interpretation of the FVRA with the more specific and later-enacted IGRA. The
IGRA does not allow Linick to be removed for 30 days, and Trump can only place
Linick on administrative leave if he does not formally remove him. The
statutory inability to remove Linick under the IGRA might control over an
interpretation of the more general and earlier-enacted FVRA that allows Trump
to replace Linick due to his being on administrative leave. And even if the
FVRA is interpreted to allow Linick to be replaced immediately under its terms,
the replacement still might independently violate the IGRA’s 30-day rule.
As we said, it’s complicated.