PA Legislature faces Supreme Court deadline to establish sentence guidelines for felony murder

With just under a month to go until a Pennsylvania Supreme Court-imposed deadline, the state Senate passed a bill that would create new, strict sentencing guidelines for people charged with second degree murder, the Pennsylvania Capital-Star..

Also known as felony murder, the charge is used when someone is killed during the commission of another felony, even if the defendant did not intend to cause that person’s death. 

It can apply to people with varying degrees of culpability. That can include an armed robber who fatally injured but did not intend to kill their victim, as well as a getaway driver who was not present.

Until a state Supreme Court ruling in March, the charge came with a mandatory life without parole sentence. In a case revolving around a 36-year-old Allegheny County man who committed armed robbery with an accomplice who shot and killed someone, the court ruled requiring such sentences in all cases violated the state constitution’s ban on cruel punishment.

The court gave lawmakers 120 days to enact legislation addressing the ruling. But key lawmakers still have disagreements over how to move forward.

More than 1,100 people in Pennsylvania are currently serving life sentences without parole on second degree murder charges. The review of their cases could be the largest resentencing effort in the history of the commonwealth.

The GOP-led Senate bill, which passed with a 30-20 bipartisan vote, would impose a minimum 35 year sentence in almost all cases of second degree murder. It would still allow judges to pass life sentences if they believe them warranted.

If a defendant meets a strict set of criteria proving lesser culpability at sentencing, a judge would be allowed to impose a mitigated sentence between 10 and 40 years. Defendants would have to prove by a preponderance of evidence that they meet six requirements, including that they were not the only participant in the underlying felony; did not cause or intend to cause the victim’s death, nor solicit or conspire in the underlying felony; did not brandish, use or threaten to use a deadly weapon; have no reason to believe another participant would use a deadly weapon; and did not cause serious bodily injury to another.

The measure would also allow the parole board to consider the release of anyone charged with second degree murder who has served at least 35 years of a life sentence or is at least 70-years-old.

“We’ve worked hard to put together a plan that strikes the appropriate balance between judicial interpretations of the rights of convicted offenders, and community interest in seeking the appropriate punishment for those convicted of deadly crimes,” said Sen. Lisa Baker (R-Luzerne), the bill’s prime sponsor. 

Roxanne Horrell, the campaign director to end life without parole with the nonprofit Straight Ahead, said she believes the Senate’s bill remains too strict in its minimum sentencing requirements. She noted that even Derek Lee, the man at the center of the Supreme Court case, would not meet the bill’s criteria for receiving a mitigated sentence.

“It’s basically a 35-to-life bill,” Horrell said. “It attempts to do these mitigating categories, but it makes an impossible test to really fulfill … it looks good, but in actuality it will be something that’s very limited.

Horrell said that she hopes negotiations with the Democratic-led House will lead to a bill that would allow judges more latitude in sentencing and earlier eligibility for parole.

“We want a bill that’s going to bring as many people home as possible,” she said. “It’s very easy to make assumptions about who people are based on what they’ve done in the past. But I think a lot of these people are just people that made terrible mistakes.”

The Public Defenders Association of Pennsylvania also opposed the bill. In a joint press release with the Public Defenders Association of Philadelphia, the group said it “replicates the mistakes of Pennsylvania’s current, unconstitutional sentencing scheme with high mandatory sentences that provide narrow opportunity for relief.”

The groups added that it could cost between $34 million and $36 million to adequately represent the 1,100 Pennsylvanians who will have their cases reviewed.

“If Defenders aren’t provided with the resources to provide adequate representation and real mitigation, then this becomes just another unfunded mandate,” said Sara Jacobson, the executive director of the Pennsylvania Public Defenders Association of Pennsylvania. “Only real representation can cure this injustice. Without it, the courts risk new sentences that are just as cruel and just as unconstitutional.”

To become law, the Senate proposal will have to pass the House, where Democrats hold a razor-thin majority. That likely means approval from the Judiciary Committee chaired by Tim Briggs (D-Montgomery), who has introduced numerous bills to end mandatory life sentences for life without parole since entering office.

Briggs said, as it stands, he can not support the Senate plan.

“I haven’t voted for any mandatory minimum [sentences] in 16 years,” he told the Capital-Star. 

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Supreme Court: 'An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice'

When people plead guilty to crimes, they typically give up the right to appeal any aspect of the outcome, including the sentence they ultimately receive. In Hunter v. United States, the Supreme Court recently imposed limits on such appeal waivers, which are improbably described as "knowing and voluntary" even when the defendant is acting under intense pressure and does not yet know what penalties and release conditions he will face, reported Reason.

"An agreement not to appeal a sentence is unenforceable when it would result in a miscarriage of justice," Justice Elena Kagan writes in the majority opinion, which was joined by seven of her colleagues. The decision defines "miscarriage of justice" as "the kind of egregious error that would bring the judicial system into disrepute." It offers some examples, including a sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum, a sentence "infected with a blatant constitutional error" such as racial bias, release conditions that violate basic rights, and a prison term imposed by a judge who "let an orangutan pick a sentence out of a hat."

As Justice Neil Gorsuch explains in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson, the need for such intervention stems from a criminal justice system that resolves nearly all cases through plea deals. "In our times, the jury trial has given way to a conveyor belt of plea bargains," Gorsuch writes. "At least some responsibility for that development lies with this Court. When confronted with coercive prosecutorial tactics designed to induce defendants to take plea deals, the Court has often condoned those practices or let them pass in silence."

The case involves Munson P. Hunter III, who was charged with participating in "a years-long scheme costing various financial institutions about half a million dollars" in unauthorized wire transfers. In February 2024, Hunter pleaded guilty to one count of aiding and abetting wire fraud. It is not hard to see why: He was also facing nine other felony charges, which federal prosecutors dropped in exchange for his guilty plea. Had he been convicted of all 10 charges, Gorsuch notes, Hunter would have faced "up to 300 years in prison and a $10 million fine."

As part of the plea agreement, Hunter gave up the right to appeal his sentence. He later had cause to regret that decision.

The crime that Hunter admitted involved the theft of $38,649 in a single transaction. But at sentencing in the Southern District of Texas three months later, Judge Sim Lake took into account the dropped charges—a variation on a disturbing practice that imposes punishment for conduct that was never admitted by the defendant or proven beyond a reasonable doubt. For purposes of sentencing, Lake assumed that Hunter had helped steal $488,352 in 26 transactions.

"This made a significant difference for Mr. Hunter," Gorsuch notes. "Had the district court sentenced him based on the amount he had pleaded guilty to stealing, he would have faced an advisory sentencing guidelines range of 15 to 21 months in prison. Now, though, he faced a recommended prison term of 41 to 51 months. And based on that calculation, the district court chose a prison sentence of 51 months." In other words, "a guilty plea to a single charge enabled prosecutors to secure a punishment based on other charges they had agreed to drop or had not even brought."

That was not Hunter's only unpleasant surprise. As a condition of his supervised release after his prison term, Lake ordered him to "participate in a mental-health treatment program" and "take all mental health medications that are prescribed by [his] treating physician." Hunter objected to the latter condition, which he argued violated his "constitutionally protected liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted administration of antipsychotic drugs."

Confronted by that claim, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit said Hunter could not raise it because he had waived his right to appeal his sentence. The Supreme Court disagreed, saying Hunter should have an opportunity to argue that his forced medication qualified as a "miscarriage of justice" because it was unconstitutional.

Gorsuch agreed with that result, as did all the justices except for Clarence Thomas. Under Hunter, Gorsuch notes, "prosecutors may not always leverage their plea-bargaining power to induce a defendant to forego the right to contest his sentence on appeal." But that issue, he emphasizes, is just one facet of the problems stemming from coercive plea deals.

"The most remarkable thing about Mr. Hunter's plea-bargaining journey may be how unremarkable it is," Gorsuch writes. "Our criminal justice system is no longer dominated by trials and sentences based on them, but plea bargains that work out in ways not unlike his own."

At the Founding, "the right to trial by jury was considered part of every American's 'birth-right and inheritance,'" Gorsuch notes. "Outraged by British efforts to deny that right in the colonies, those who fought the Revolution cited its suppression as one of their reasons for declaring independence. After the Revolution, too, the founding generation took care to secure the right to trial by jury in criminal cases not just once, but twice, in the Constitution and Bill of Rights they adopted."

Plea bargains "didn't begin to emerge as an alternative to trial in serious criminal cases until the mid-nineteenth century," Gorsuch writes. But today, around 95 percent of convictions are based on guilty pleas, making the right to trial more imaginary than real.

The Supreme Court was initially skeptical of that development, expressing concern about the power of prosecutors to coerce guilty pleas by threatening defendants with additional charges and penalties if they insisted on making the government prove its case. But by 1971, the Court was describing plea bargaining as "highly desirable," something "to be encouraged," and "an essential component of the administration of justice."

Why was it essential? "If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial," the Court worried in Santobello v. New York, "the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities."

The Court reiterated that view six years later in Blackledge v. Allison. "Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world," it said, "the fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country's criminal justice system. Properly administered, they can benefit all concerned."

What does a "properly administered" plea bargaining system look like? The Court provided a clue in the 1978 case Bordenkircher v. Hayes, which considered what happened after a Kentucky man was charged with forging a check for $88.30.

Based on that charge, Paul Hayes faced a sentence of two to 10 years in prison. If Hayes pleaded guilty, the prosecutor said, he would recommend a five-year sentence. But if Hayes insisted on going to trial, the prosecutor warned, he would be charged under Kentucky's "three strikes" law, which authorized a life sentence. Uncowed, Hayes said he wanted a trial. The prosecutor delivered on his threat, and Hayes was sentenced to life in prison. The Supreme Court saw no problem with the prosecutor's tactics.

Appeal waivers add another dimension to this situation, and now the Court has recognized that justice may require overriding them. In addition to the examples offered in the majority opinion, Gorsuch says the "miscarriage of justice" rule should also apply to "sentences imposing penalties the law reserves for offenses different [from] those of which the defendant stands convicted." Hunter's 51-month sentence fits that description, and there are many other examples.

Under the Court's decision in Hunter, "a defendant may be able to appeal a sentence imposing a condition of release that violates his right to be free from forced medication, or a condition that violates his right to speak or worship freely, or any other condition that violates one of his recognized constitutional rights," Gorsuch says. "I would think a miscarriage of justice all but certain to arise whenever a sentence infringes a constitutional right that was 'firmly established at the time of sentencing.'"

The majority also said sentences "marred by serious procedural errors" should be appealable notwithstanding waivers, Gorsuch notes. In his view, that would include "not only a sentence chosen by an orangutan" but also penalties "reflecting a marked departure from mandatory sentencing procedures."

Even "aspects of sentencing that can require a degree of judicial discretion," such as "the application of the advisory sentencing guidelines," "the imposition of supervised release conditions within statutory and constitutional bounds," and the weighing of sentencing factors, could trigger the exception recognized by the Court, Gorsuch says. "A miscarriage of justice would seem to arise, as well, when a district court metes out punishment that is so substantively unreasonable that it would fail under the 'deferential abuse-of-discretion standard' that appellate courts already apply in sentencing challenges."

Gorsuch sees "deeper problems" with appeal waivers. "The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, this Court has held, tolerates only 'voluntary and knowing' guilty pleas," he notes. A guilty plea "must be made both 'voluntarily' and 'with full understanding of the consequences.'" But "how can a defendant 'know' and 'fully understand' at the time he signs a plea agreement that a court might later order punishment that defies the Constitution, a federal statute, or this Court's precedents?"

Gorsuch also notes that the Supreme Court "has found prospective waivers of
many other statutory rights invalid and unenforceable." He says the Trump administration, which urged the justices to uphold the 5th Circuit's decision in Hunter's case, "has offered no colorable explanation why a defendant's prospective waiver of his statutory right to appeal his sentence should be treated differently."

If a defendant "may prospectively waive the right to appeal his sentence," Gorsuch writes, "one might wonder what's to stop prosecutors from pushing their luck further yet. Might we eventually face plea agreements that include prospective waivers of the defendant's right to complain about future unreasonable searches and seizures of his home? Or prospective waivers of a defendant's right to seek a jury (rather than bench) trial in future proceedings if he ever is charged with another crime?"

Two centuries ago, "it was likely unimaginable that almost every federal criminal case would be resolved by plea bargain," Gorsuch says. "Forty years ago, it may have been no easier to foresee that plea bargaining defendants would be pressed to waive their statutory right to appeal sentences yet to be imposed. Let alone that the federal government would argue these waivers prevent defendants from appealing even blatantly unlawful or unconstitutional sentences chosen by an orangutan."

Although the Supreme Court "is not responsible for all these developments," Gorsuch writes, "it has encouraged some of them and stood silent while others took hold. Today, the Court finally begins to correct course, taking an important step toward reining in appeal waivers. It is not a solution to all of plea bargaining's excesses, and perhaps not even those associated with appeal waivers. But it is a start."

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Pennsylvania inmates serving LWOP for 2nd degree murder face uphill battle to gain release

While 19 states, including New York and California, allow the governor unilateral clemency power, Pennsylvania is among 10 states that require the approval of its pardon board. Without the board’s recommendation, the governor is barred from commuting a person’s sentence, reported The Appeal. Three members—a victim advocate, a corrections expert, and a medical or mental health expert—are nominated by the governor and approved by the state senate. The lieutenant governor and attorney general comprise the other two members.

Acknowledgment of an application can take up to 18 months. Only then does an applicant undergo an institutional review, including a psychological review as well as an interview with the prison superintendent. Former DOC secretary John Wetzel instituted the policy of interviewing applicants. His successors have continued the practice.  

Then the process continues to a merit review. In 2026, the board scheduled three merit reviews for commutations. At each review, the board votes on hundreds of applications, reviewing the person’s institutional record, program participation, staff support, their personal statement, future plans, and letters supporting or opposing their release. For applicants serving life without parole, three of the five members must approve before they can proceed to a public hearing.

Before the public hearing, board members interview the applicant over Zoom. Each interview lasts no longer than 30 minutes. At the hearing, which is also virtual, family members of their victims as well as the applicant’s loved ones have the opportunity to testify.

Until the 1990s, an applicant needed a majority vote for commutation. Then, in 1994, however, Reginald McFadden, who had been granted commutation two years earlier, killed two people and raped a third. Recidivism among clemency recipients for any offense is extremely low. Nonetheless, his acts prompted widespread fears of second chances and a 1997 legislative change requiring a unanimous vote for all commutations. Between 1967 and 1994, over 360 life sentences had been commuted. 

Since 1995, the board has reviewed 190 applicants serving life without parole. Of those, 80 (or fewer than half) were recommended to the governor. Seventy-eight have been granted commutation. 

Celeste Trusty, now the state legislative affairs director for FAMM, served as secretary for the Pennsylvania Board of Pardons during previous governor Tom Wolf’s last year in office (December 2020 to January 2022). “It really does matter who’s in office, who’s on the board, what the public sentiment is about commutation [and] the political ambitions of the people involved in the process,” she told The Appeal. She noted that, because Wolf had no plans to run for higher office, “the political liability that people generally associate with second chances and clemency was removed, and he was able to boldly go forward.”

During Wolf’s two terms as governor, the board held 114 hearings for lifers and recommended 55. Wolf granted commutation to all of them.

As attorney general, Shapiro was a member of the pardon board. In 2019, he cast the fewest votes for commutation. Since becoming governor in 2023, the board has conducted 46 hearings for lifers and recommended 15 people. Shapiro granted commutation to all 15. (During his first term, Wolf granted commutation to 19 people, more than his past four predecessors combined.)

Bolden initially applied at his mother’s urging. The board denied his first two applications. 

Since then, he has developed multiple sclerosis, which has progressed to the point where he requires a wheelchair. It also greatly limits the use of his left hand and causes constant pain. 

This past March, Bolden learned that he received support from the Department of Corrections Secretary Laurel Harry. His merit review is scheduled for July 9. If approved, his public hearing will be on September 11. 

“Little by little, I’m starting to have more hope,” he said. Decades behind bars, including four years with execution hanging over his head, made it impossible to envision a life beyond the prison door. 

“The gravity and weight of prison is so hard to put into words,” he said. 

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CREATORS: Punishment Without Limits

Matthew T. Mangino
CREATORS
April 8, 2026

A new Tennessee law will make it easier for people with felony convictions to vote. For years, Tennessee prohibited former offenders who were behind on child support or court costs and fines from voting. The state legislature recently approved a measure that would permit people who have complied with child support for one year to rejoin the voting and rolls. In addition, the law no longer ties payment of court costs and fines to the right to vote.

According to the Prison Project, laws in 48 states ban people with felony convictions from voting. In 2022, an estimated 4.4 million Americans, representing 2% of the voting-age population, were ineligible to vote due to similar disenfranchisement laws or policies.

These never-ending penalties are known as collateral consequences of crime. Disenfranchising former offenders is one of a myriad of lifetime penalties piled on people convicted of felonies in this country.

Lawmakers nationwide would do well to eliminate some of the collateral consequences of a criminal conviction. A criminal record shouldn't be a life sentence. The ever-growing list of collateral sanctions often put former offenders in a position to fail.

A collateral sanction is a penalty, disability or disadvantage that is related to employment or occupational licensing as a result of an offender's conviction. The sanctions apply by operation of law, whether or not the penalty, disability or disadvantage is included in the sentence.

According to The Council of State Governments' Justice Center, a little less than one in three offenders released from prison are reincarcerated within three years, either committing a new crime or violating conditions of parole. While that is an improvement over numbers from a decade ago, it is still too many.

The problems with our crowded prisons are not just the result of punishing offenders for their criminal conduct — the problems are compounded by ongoing sanctions that hinder former offenders from successfully reintegrating into society.

According to a 2024 National Employment Law Project report, an estimated 80 million Americans have a criminal record. The American Bar Association (ABA) has identified over 38,000 penalties — collateral consequences — that can impact people long after they have completed their criminal sentence.

The ABA Task Force on Collateral Consequences found that a former offender "may be ineligible for many federally funded health and welfare benefits, food stamps, public housing and federal educational assistance." As a result, their ability to earn a living in their chosen profession may be limited in that an offender "may no longer qualify for certain employment and professional licenses."

Collateral consequences may prohibit military service, possession of a firearm or federal security clearance. A non-citizen may lose the right to reside in the United States.

Supporting a family is that much more difficult when employers refuse to hire former offenders. Employers may be interested in giving a person a second chance, but they are concerned that hiring a person with a criminal record might expose them to liability for negligent hiring if the person commits a crime on the job.

According to the Vera Institute of Justice, half of all states punish people who cannot pay fines and fees associated with criminal proceedings by taking away their driver's licenses. This practice impacts nearly 11 million people nationwide and diminishes their ability to secure a job, maintain stable housing and participate in their community.

More states, as well as the federal government, need to take action to remove heavy-handed sanctions that drive up costs, increase victimization and often doom offenders to a never-ending cycle of poverty or worse — reincarceration.

Matthew T. Mangino is of counsel with Luxenberg, Garbett, Kelly & George P.C. His book, "The Executioner's Toll," 2010, was released by McFarland Publishing. You can reach him at www.mattmangino.com and follow him on Twitter @MatthewTMangino

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PA Supreme Court strikes down mandatory LWOP for felony murder

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled it’s unconstitutional to require mandatory life sentences without parole for people convicted of felony murder, The Pennsylvania Capital-Star.

“Life without parole imposes the harshest imprisonment sanction permitted under the law ─ imprisonment until death without the opportunity for consideration of release ─ regardless of culpability,” Chief Justice Debra Todd wrote in the majority opinion. “Due to this scheme’s mandatory nature and its unique severity, it poses a great risk of disproportionate punishment.” 

Life sentences will still be allowed for second-degree murder on a case-by case-basis, but Todd writes that it violates the state constitution’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment to mandate it in all cases.

The decision was near-unanimous, with only one judge, Justice Kevin Brobson, dissenting in part.

But what the ruling means for the more than 1,000 Pennsylvanians serving life sentences without parole on felony murder charges is still unclear.

The ruling gives the general assembly 120 days to come up with a legislative fix to the state’s sentencing laws, but that could take many different shapes. And it will likely kick off what could be the largest resentencing effort the commonwealth has ever taken, though the timeline will depend on decisions made by lawmakers.

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Surprise: Two years after Louisiana lawmakers voted for longer sentences prison costs surge

Two years after Gov. Jeff Landry and state lawmakers voted to ensure people convicted of crimes serve more of their prison sentences, the governor’s staff says state incarceration expenses are surging. reported the Louisiana Illuminator.

Landry’s team presented a budget proposal Friday that includes an $82 million year-over-year increase in state funding for its corrections system, which pays for nine prisons as well as the parole and probation system. State spending on Louisiana State Penitentiary, the maximum security prison in Angola, would go up at least $17.5 million alone, according to Landry’s budget presentation.

The change equates to an 11% hike from current state funding in the corrections budget and would bring yearly state general funding spent on those services from $716.5 million to $798.2 million starting July 1.

Gary Westcott, secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Corrections, said some of the increase can be attributed to criminal sentencing changes Landry and the Louisiana Legislature have imposed.

At the beginning of his term in 2024, the governor called a special session for lawmakers to enact tough-on-crime legislation aimed at making sure people with criminal convictions spend more time in state prisons. One measure more than doubled the minimum amount of time people were required to stay incarcerated from 35% to 85% of their full prison sentence.

Another law change now limits people from having their prison stay fully reduced for the time they spend sitting in jail before they are convicted or plead guilty. Additionally, Landry and lawmakers abolished almost all access to parole and the number of people being released via parole has dropped to its lowest level in 20 years, according to ProPublica.

Critics of the new sentencing process expected it to increase the state’s prison population, which appears to be happening. Since Landry has taken office, the number of state inmates in Louisiana has grown by approximately 2,000 people to 30,100 overall, according to statistics on the corrections department’s website.

Angola’s prison population has gone up 426 people since 2024, according to the prison system. It now stands at 4,258, not including those being held in the federal immigration detention camp opened on the prison’s grounds last year.

The $17.5 million increase Landry has proposed for Angola’s budget next year includes a planned expansion separate from the immigration detainee camp. The governor wants to put 688 more state inmates on the sprawling 18,000-acre campus following the rehabilitation of older buildings on the grounds. The extra prisoners will require Angola to hire 150 more staff members.

In an interview, Westcott said many of the 688 additional people at Angola are expected to already be part of the state inmate population. They would normally be held as state prisoners in local jails, but those facilities are becoming overcrowded following Landry’s sentencing changes. Sheriffs are asking for state inmates to be moved from parish lockups into state facilities because they lack space to house them, Westcott said.

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Former Illinois deputy sentenced to 20 years for killing woman who called 911

A former Illinois sheriff’s deputy was sentenced to 20 years in prison for fatally shooting Sonya Massey, a Black woman who had dialed 911 to report a possible prowler outside her Springfield home, reported The Associated Press.

Sean Grayson, who is white, was convicted in October of second-degree murder in a police brutality case that prompted protests over systemic racism and led to a U.S. Department of Justice inquiry. Grayson, 31, testified at trial that he feared Massey was about to scald him with a pot of steaming hot water that she had removed from the stove.

Grayson, who has been incarcerated since he was charged, received the maximum possible sentence.

He apologized in court, saying he wished he could bring Massey back and spare her family the pain he caused. His attorney sought a sentence of six years, noting that Grayson has late stage colon cancer that has spread to his liver and lungs.

“I made a lot of mistakes that night. There were points when I should’ve acted, and I didn’t. I froze,” Grayson said. “I made terrible decisions that night. I’m sorry.”

‘It rocked the country’

Massey’s parents and two teenage children, who lobbied for the maximum sentence, said their lives had changed dramatically since her death. Her children said they had to grow up without a mother, while Massey’s mother said she lived in fear.

“I cry every day,” Massey’s mother, Donna Massey, said.

“I’m afraid to call the police in fear that I might end up like Sonya,” she told the court.

State’s Attorney John Milhiser argued that Massey would still be alive if someone else from the sheriff’s department had responded to her 911 call.

“Sonya Massey’s death rocked her family, but it rocked the community, it rocked the country,” State’s Attorney John Milhiser said. “We have to do whatever we can to ensure it never happens again.”

The family reacted with a loud cheer — “Yes!” — after Judge Ryan Cadagin read the sentence. He admonished them for the outburst.

“Twenty years is not enough, but they did what they could do,” Massey’s 16-year-old daughter Summer told reporters after the hearing.

With a day shaved off his sentence for every day of good behavior, plus credit for nearly 19 months already spent behind bars, Grayson could be released in just under 8 1/2 years.

The day of the shooting

In the early morning hours of July 6, 2024, Massey — a 36-year-old single mother who struggled with mental health issues — summoned emergency responders because she feared there was a prowler outside her Springfield home.

According to body camera footage, Grayson and sheriff’s Deputy Dawson Farley, who was not charged, searched outside Massey’s home before meeting her at her door. Massey appeared confused and repeatedly said, “Please, God.”

The deputies entered her house, Grayson noticed the pot on the stove and ordered Farley to move it. Instead, Massey went to the stove, retrieved the pot and teased Grayson for moving away from “the hot, steaming water.”

From this moment, the exchange quickly escalated.

Massey said: “I rebuke you in the name of Jesus.”

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Alito and colleagues challenge compassionate release

 Madiba K. Dennie writing for Balls & Strikes:

 Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in three cases about the conditions under which federal judges can reduce a prison sentence. As a general rule, judges may not modify a term of imprisonment once it’s been imposed. But four decades ago, Congress enacted a statutory exception for compassionate release, empowering judges to shorten a prison term if “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant relief.

Congress did not, however, give much guidance as to what a compelling reason actually is, beyond specifying that rehabilitation alone is insufficient, and that any sentence reduction must be “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Identifying qualifying circumstances is thus up to individual judges evaluating requests for release—and, of course, a matter of some debate

In the first case the Court heard, Fernandez v. United States, a district court judge reduced a sentence because he doubted the reliability of the evidence, and had concerns about a significant sentencing disparity between Fernandez and one of his co-defendants. A federal appeals court then held that the district court judge had abused his discretion because he should not have considered Fernandez’s potential innocence—something neither Congress nor the Sentencing Commission ever said.

In the other two cases, Rutherford v. United States and Carter v. United States, judges said they could not consider the fact that the defendants asking for a sentence reduction would have received significantly shorter prison terms had they been convicted after Congress enacted the First Step Act of 2018, a bipartisan criminal justice reform law. But this, too, is not so simple: The Sentencing Commission has explicitly said judges can consider factors like this under certain circumstances.

The uninspiring success rate of the defendants in these three cases—zero for three—doesn’t support an inference that judges are especially inclined to find “extraordinary and compelling reasons” to reduce a prison sentence. Yet Justice Samuel Alito spent Wednesday morning defending the sanctity of mandatory minimum sentences, deeply disturbed by the notion that judges could be letting people out of prison for little reason other than their personal belief that prison is bad. 

“There are a lot of district judges and other federal judges who don’t like mandatory minimums,” Alito said to Fernandez’s counsel. “Could a district judge say, ‘You know what, that mandatory minimum is too much under the circumstances of this case, so I’m going to grant a sentence reduction?’” he asked. 

Alito pressed Rutherford’s counsel, David Frederick, on this same issue. “Is it a permissible factor for a judge to include in the determination a disapproval of the mandatory minimum?” Alito asked. Frederick politely responded with the answer the statute already provides: that a judge would be abusing their discretion if they just didn’t like mandatory minimums, but would be within their discretion if they thought departing from a mandatory minimum was justified by the circumstances of the particular case. Alito was unsatisfied. “I don’t quite see the difference between those two things,” he said.

To illustrate the difference, Frederick offered a hypothetical, imagining a 75-year-old with a life-threatening disease in a prison without adequate medical facilities. “It is not an abuse of discretion for the court to say that, in this particular circumstance, that mandatory minimum is too harsh,” said Frederick. At this, Chief Justice John Roberts interrupted. “Well, you really shouldn’t call it a mandatory minimum then,” said Roberts. “You probably should call it something like the presumptive minimum depending upon subsequent developments.”

Alito later moved to Carter’s counsel, David O’Neill, who also affirmed that district courts could not reduce sentences solely because they disagree with mandatory minimums as a matter of principle. When Alito asked if any provision of the statute “specifically” states that, Carter, too, explained that any categorical approach would be at odds with a statute that’s “all about the individual circumstances.”

If Alito really wants to be angry about the criminal legal system, there are countless real problems he can choose from. His choice to fixate on hypothetical judges with vendettas against mandatory minimums instead is an illustrative example of the conservative conception of criminal law. In Alito’s view, the criminal legal system already does what it is supposed to do: inflict maximum punishment. Any attempts to reform that system are inherently illegitimate.

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Things can always be worse: Iranian authorities severed the fingers of three men convicted of theft

Iranian authorities severed the fingers of three men convicted of theft, said Human Rights Watch (HRW) as reported by Jurist-News. HRW Iran researcher Bahar Saba denounced the punishment, stating, “Amputation is torture, plain and simple. Yet Iran persists in carrying out cruel and inhuman punishments that fly in the face of its human rights obligations.”

Mehdi Shahivand, Mehdi Sharafian and Hadi Rostami were detained in August 2017 following accusations that they had burglarized several houses and robbed safes. The court sentenced all of the individuals to amputations of four fingers of their right hands, leaving only the palm and the thumb. In April of 2022, HRW stated that there was evidence that the trials were unjust:

Evidence strongly suggests that the trial was grossly unfair. According to case information review by Human Rights Watch and accounts of informed sources, the men did not have access to lawyers during the investigation phase and only saw a lawyer twice–once when they signed the retention documents and once during the court hearings. The men have also said that the authorities tortured and ill-treated them while in the custody of the police’s Investigation Unit (Agahi) in Urmia… beating and flogging them and suspending them from their hands and wrists.

The UN Office of the High Commissioner in June 2022 called on authorities to cancel the planned amputations of these three men, along with five others. The UN reported that, per Iranian civil society organizations, at least 237 people who were “mostly from poorer segments of society” were sentenced to amputations between January 2000 and September 2020, with sentences being carried out in at least 129 cases.

Hand amputation is grounded in Article 278 of the Islamic Penal Code, which permits this type of punishment for “Hudud crimes” such as theft, adultery, slander and drinking alcohol. Iran’s Human Rights Monitor detailed some of the history of amputation in Iran, emphasizing that despite “widespread international condemnation, Iranian authorities have continued to enforce this brutal punishment beyond 2020.” Critics maintain that this penalty is a stark violation of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). While Iran has ratified the ICCPR, it has not signed or ratified the CAT. The ICCPR explicitly mandates that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”

Iran has recently been subjected to strict international scrutiny due to record executions and other purported violations of international law.

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Legal Intelligencer--High Court: ARD Admission Is Not Considered a Prior Offense to Enhance Sentencing for a DUI

Matthew T. Mangino
The Legal Intelligencer
June 12, 2025

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has ruled that 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3806 of the Motor Vehicle Code—which includes accelerated rehabilitation disposition (ARD) in the definition of a prior offense for purpose of sentencing on a second or subsequent driving under the influence conviction—unconstitutional.

The court found that ARD does not equate to a conviction because it lacks the procedural safeguards of a criminal trial, such as the right to a jury trial and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The high court’s decision finally puts to rest the evolving question of whether admission into the ARD program can be used as a sentence enhancement for purposes of deterring recidivist conduct on Pennsylvania’s roadways.

In May 2020, the Pennsylvania Superior Court turned the DUI statute on its head.

Igor Chichkin was charged with DUI in Philadelphia in 2017. Chichkin had a prior DUI charge in which he received ARD, a diversion program. Upon acceptance into the ARD program a defendant need not plead guilty or not guilty. If the defendant successfully completes the program the charges are dismissed and the defendant may seek the expungement of the charge.

Prior to the decision is Chichkin, if a defendant was arrested within 10 years of accepting ARD, he or she could be charged with a DUI second offense which carried a mandatory minimum of 30 days in jail, 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3804 (b) (2). For sentencing purposes in Pennsylvania an ARD was considered a prior offense, Section 3806 (a).

Chichkin went to trial on his new offense and was convicted of DUI. As a result of his prior ARD, he was sentenced to 30 days to six months in jail.

On appeal, Chichkin raised the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision of Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). The Alleyne court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused a right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury, which can only be accomplished if all of the facts that are elements of the crime are presented to the jury. If an element of the crime increases the mandatory minimum punishment, it must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.

Alleyne was an expansion of the high court's prior ruling in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).

Alleyne held "a defendant has due process rights to specific notice in the charging document and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, as well as, the constitutional guarantee of a jury determination" with regard to "any factual determination that triggers a mandatory minimum sentence."

As a result, the court vacated Chichkin’s mandatory minimum sentence.

The court wrote about the prior offense excused by ARD, “They are a "fact" that, pursuant to Alleyne, Apprendi, and their progeny, must be presented to the fact finder and determined beyond a reasonable doubt before a trial court may impose a mandatory minimum sentence under Section 3804,” see Commonwealth v. Chichkin, 232 A.3d 959 (Pa. Super. 2020).

The Chichkin decision created chaos for prosecutors and the courts. However, that chaos was short lived. In fact, I anticipated the recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in an article for “The Legel Intelligencer” in January 2023. I wrote then, “The prosecution of repeat DUI offenders is back where it was prior to 2020 ... this is not the last we will hear on this subject. Stay tuned, this matter will most likely end up before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.”

How did this matter ultimately get to the high court? In Commonwealth v. Richards, 284 A.3d 214 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), and Commonwealth v. Moroz, 284 A.3d 227 (Pa. Super. 2022) (en banc), the Superior Court held that, pursuant to Section 3806, a defendant’s previous acceptance of ARD for a DUI constitutes a prior offense for purposes of imposing a mandatory minimum sentence under Section 3804.

The court made it clear that the decision of a defendant to enter the ARD program is voluntary. A defendant “is free to reject participation in the program if he wishes to avail himself of his full panoply of constitutional rights.”

Applying for, and being accepted into, the ARD program does not carry the same procedural safeguards of a conviction following trial. The court found “The safeguards in place to be adequate.” The court emphasized that “Section 3806(a) appropriately notifies a defendant that earlier ARD acceptance will be considered a prior DUI offense for future sentencing purposes.” The voluntary nature of the ARD program mitigates the due process concerns expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court. As a result, a defendant’s prior acceptance of ARD fits within the limited “prior conviction” exception set forth in Apprendi.

The Superior Court was unequivocal in its holding in Richards, “We expressly overrule Chichkin.”

On May 30, 2025, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Shifflett, No. 26 MAP 2024. In 2012, Shifflett was charged with the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol 75 Pa.C.S. Section 3802(d)(3). He was accepted into an ARD program.

In 2022, George Thomas Shifflett was arrested for another DUI and, based on his previous acceptance of ARD for his 2012 offense, he was charged with DUI as a second offense.

Shifflett pleaded guilty to the second DUI. At that time, the commonwealth asserted that, pursuant to Section 3806 the plea constituted a second DUI offense. The trial court agreed with Shifflett’s claim that the prior ARD should be considered a prior offense.

The commonwealth appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to treat the appellant’s 2012 offense as a prior offense under Section 3806 and impose an enhanced sentence under Section 3804 as a result of the decisions in Richards and Moroz holding that, pursuant to Section 3806, a defendant’s previous acceptance of ARD for a DUI constitutes a prior offense for purposes of imposing a mandatory minimum sentence under Section 3804.

According to the opinion in Shifflett, the trial court, in its opinion pursuant to Rule 1925(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, concluded that, in light of Richards and Moroz, it erred in granting the appellant’s motion to exclude at sentencing evidence of his previous acceptance of ARD for his 2012 offense, and, accordingly, requested that the Superior Court remand the case for resentencing. In a unanimous, unpublished memorandum opinion, the Superior Court vacated Shifflett’s judgment of sentence and remanded for resentencing.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed to hear Shifflett’s appeal focusing on the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne, and whether it was unconstitutional to consider Shifflett’s previous acceptance of ARD as a prior offense for sentencing purposes.

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief Justice Debra Todd, writing for a 4-3 majority, found “acceptance into an ARD program does not offer a defendant any of the constitutional safeguards that accompany either a criminal conviction or a guilty plea proceeding.”

The safeguards recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court’s in Apprendi and Alleyne, namely that any fact which increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum, other than the fact of a prior conviction, must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt are not present with admission to ARD.

The high court continued, “Thus, an individual’s previous acceptance of ARD, which, when construed as a prior offense under Section 3806 to increase the penalty for a subsequent conviction pursuant to Section 3804, is a fact that must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The reasoning in Chichkin is again the law of the commonwealth. Once and for all, admission to ARD is not considered a prior offense for purposes of enhancing a driving under the influence sentence.

Matthew T. Mangino is of counsel with Luxenberg, Garbett, Kelly and George and the former district attorney of Lawrence County, Pennsylvania. He is the author of "The Executioner’s Toll." You can follow him on Bluesky @matthewmangino.bsky.social or contact him at mmangino@lgkg.com.

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States consider surgical castration as a punishment for sex crimes against children

 The Marshall Project expands on castration as punishment:

Last year, Louisiana sparked a slew of sensational headlines when state legislators passed a law allowing surgical castration as punishment for people convicted of sex crimes against children. That was the first successful legislation in a new wave of bills proposing both chemical and surgical castration in states such as New Mexico, Mississippi, and South Carolina.

This March, Oklahoma’s House of Representatives passed a bill that would make chemical castration a precondition of parole in sex offenses involving a child under the age of 13. As the bill headed over to the state senate, Republican Rep. Scott Fetgatter made its intent clear, saying, “I will fight for stricter laws against such offenders to better protect our kids.”

But while supporters of these bills echo that cause, many experts say the approach is needlessly cruel and lacks a sound scientific basis.

Castration — both reversible chemical and permanent surgical castration — does lead to the reduction of testosterone and a diminished libido. But “there is literally no evidence that testosterone is the driving factor of individuals committing crimes of a sexual nature,” said Kristen M. Budd, a senior analyst with the Sentencing Project, a research and advocacy organization working to reduce the number of people behind bars in the U.S.

Castration is not a new idea. According to the Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, doctors in the U.S. have been using hormone therapy — via off-label use of medications for conditions like prostate cancer — since the 1940s to lower the testosterone in men with “pathological sexual behavior.” Sandy Rozek, the communications director for the National Association for Rational Sexual Offense Laws, told The Marshall Project that she’s occasionally heard from people who want to avoid reoffending that the treatment plans they’ve created with their doctors have included surgical castration. Rozek draws a line between these self-appointed procedures and the criminal justice bills mandating castration as a condition of parole or as a court-ordered punishment.

“If your choice is between 10 more years in prison and castration, that’s not really a choice,” she said. “That’s coercion.”

The coercive nature of the state permanently or temporarily altering a man’s body in exchange for release is what led the courts in Michigan to deem the practice unlawful and experts like Budd to point out its similarity to 20th century eugenics, which resulted in the systematic sterilization of thousands of incarcerated women who were deemed “subnormal.”

Proponents like Democratic Louisiana Rep. Delisha Boyd, who co-authored the castration bill that became law in her state, believe that the harshness of the procedure is a self-evident deterrent against sex crime. Boyd, who comes from a family with a history of child sexual abuse, emphatically told NPR, “Even if just one rapist changes his mind about raping a child, I will take that.”

According to Gary Taylor, a researcher and professor who wrote an authoritative book on the history of castration, this strategy has long been practiced with the goal of inciting fear. Some ancient societies would kill enemies and cut off their testicles to intimidate future foes. The practice also permeated the antebellum and Jim Crow South, in which the extra-judicial lynchings of Black people were punctuated with castration as a form of White supremacist psychological terror, with the severed testicles often kept as souvenirs.

The bill Boyd co-authored made Louisiana the first state to allow judges to order surgical castration as a punishment, but there are at least 10 states that passed laws before 2008 to allow chemical or surgical castration as a condition of parole. California led the way in 1996. But despite these laws having been on the books for years, there is little information on how often states perform these procedures. A former sex crime prosecutor told the LAist in 2019 he never saw it done in Los Angeles.

Given the scant information available, the experts we spoke with are not aware of any concrete way to demonstrate that castration deters crime. But Rozek believes the claim is analogous to arguments made in favor of the death penalty, which numerous studies show offers no unique deterrent to violent crime. “People don’t stop and think about things like that when they are committing an offense,” she said. And like the death penalty, Budd is worried that when this punishment is performed, it will be done disproportionately to Black people who have White victims.

In terms of recidivism — whether a formerly incarcerated person reoffends — both Budd and Rozek note that people convicted of sex offenses are less likely than people convicted of other crimes to be rearrested after release. A study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics that followed the post-prison lives of people across 30 states released in 2005 found that about 67% of people convicted of sex offenses were rearrested in the nine years following their release, compared with about 84% of people convicted of other crimes.

For those at risk of reoffending, they point to treatment programs, like cognitive behavioral therapy — which studies have consistently found to reduce sexual recidivism — over the unknowns of castration. Budd also notes that castration can further ostracize those who have committed crimes of a sexual nature. Instead of states investing millions into post-release punishments, such as sex offender registries, she believes society would be safer if lawmakers “actually created spaces for people who may have attraction to children to go seek help without fear.”

While a castration bill in South Carolina is still working its way through the legislature, and one in Oklahoma was withdrawn from an appropriation committee, the bills proposed earlier this year in New Mexico, Iowa and Mississippi have died. Rozek takes no solace in this. “The first year out, most of the bills won't pass,” she said. “But this is just the first phase. They will come back.”

Similarly, Budd believes that with the bipartisan passing of the surgical castration law in Louisiana, we could see this punishment be adopted for other crimes. “It happened with sex offense registries,” she said. “Now you have violent offender registries in states like Ohio and Oklahoma that list people’s home address and their vehicle information once they're released from prison.”

While these punitive bills can boost legislators on both sides of the aisle hoping to look tough on crime, Budd warns that they can doom the formerly incarcerated looking for a clean start. “These laws take away hope, chance for change, and human dignity.”

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