The Supreme Court ruled today, 6–3, that if a police officer fails to inform you of your right to remain silent and avoid self-incrimination when you're suspected of a crime, you can't sue under federal law as a violation of your civil rights, reported Reason.
To be clear, the Court isn't overturning Miranda v. Arizona,
the 1966 Supreme Court ruling that determined that it's a violation of a
suspect's Fifth Amendment rights for police to interrogate him or her about a
crime without informing them they have the right to remain silent and the right
to request an attorney. But what the Court ruled today is that if and when this
right is violated, people can't turn to Section 1983 of
the U.S. code and file a civil action lawsuit against the police officer or law
enforcement agency and seek redress or damages.
Today's ruling, Vega v.
Tekoh, involved an investigation of sexual assault at a Los Angeles medical
center in 2014. Terence Tekoh worked at the medical center and was interrogated
by L.A. County Deputy Carlos Vega. Vega did not tell Tekoh about his Miranda rights
and extracted a written confession. This confession was admitted into evidence
in court, and a judge determined that his Miranda rights weren't
violated because he wasn't in custody when he confessed. Even so, the first
case ended in a mistrial, and then Tekoh was ultimately found not guilty in a
second trial. Tekoh then sued using Section 1983 against Vega and others seeking
damages for the violation of his Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination. The case wound its way all the way up to the Supreme Court
to hear in April. The American Civil Liberties Union and the Cato
Institute together
submitted an amicus brief to the Court supporting the
position that Vega could be held liable.
But in a pure ideological split, the Court today
determined that a violation of the Miranda rules does not provide a
basis for a civil rights lawsuit under Section 1983. Justice Samuel Alito wrote
the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices
Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett.
Essentially, Alito's opinion says that the purpose
of Miranda is to serve as a safeguard against compelled
self-incrimination by police or prosecutors. It was not intended to establish
that it was inherently a Fifth Amendment violation if somebody voluntarily
confesses or self-incriminates himself or herself prior to or absent of a Miranda warning.
The Miranda warning is intended to be a "prophylactic," to
safeguard against potential deliberate abuse. Alito writes:
Miranda did not hold that a violation of the
rules it established necessarily constitute a Fifth Amendment violation, and it
is difficult to see how it could have held otherwise. For one thing, it is easy
to imagine many situations in which an un-Mirandized suspect in custody may
make self-incriminating statements without any hint of compulsion. In addition,
the warnings that the Court required included components, such as notification
of the right to have retained or appointed counsel present during questioning,
that do not concern self-incrimination per se but are instead plainly designed
to safeguard that right. And the same is true of Miranda's detailed rules
about the waiver of the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney.
Alito concludes that because a violation of Miranda is
not automatically a violation of the Fifth Amendment, there is no justification
to permit a civil rights lawsuit. The opinion reverses a judgment in Tekoh's
favor and remands it back to the lower courts to revisit.
The dissent is written by Justice Elena Kagan and
joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor. Kagan observes the
obvious in her dissent, that this ruling will make it harder for defendants to
pursue legal remedies when their rights are violated:
The majority observes that defendants may still seek
"the suppression at trial of statements obtained" in violation
of Miranda's procedures. … But sometimes, such a statement will not be
suppressed. And sometimes, as a result, a defendant will be wrongly convicted
and spend years in prison. He may succeed, on appeal or in habeas, in getting
the conviction reversed. But then, what remedy does he have for all the harm he
has suffered? The point of §1983 is to provide such redress—because a remedy "is
a vital component of any scheme for vindicating cherished constitutional
guarantees." … The majority here, as elsewhere, injures the right by
denying the remedy.
Reason's Billy Binion noted
earlier this week that the Supreme Court had declined to take on cases
where federal officers had been granted civil liability against lawsuits when
they violate the rights of citizens and even commit crimes in the line of duty.
This case continues this trend—the Supreme Court recognizes that these
constitutional rights exist, but by shielding officers from liability for
violating these rights, the Court undermines the necessary tools to make sure
police take them seriously.
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