Quinta Jurecic and Benjamin Wittes write in The Atlantic
about the current situation in American governance. Are we in a constitutional crisis,
constitutional rot or constitutional infection?
The term “constitutional
crisis” gets thrown around a lot, but it actually has no fixed meaning.
It’s not a legal term of art, though lawyers and law professors—as well as
political scientists and journalists—sometimes use is as though it were. Saying
that something is a constitutional crisis is a little like saying that someone
is going through a “nervous breakdown”—a term which does not map neatly onto
any specific clinical condition, but is evocative of a certain constellation of
mental health emergencies. It’s hard to define a constitutional crisis, but you
know one when you see it. Or do you?
There have been various attempts to define the term over the
years. Writing in the wake of the impeachment of President Bill Clinton, and
the turmoil of the 2000 election, the political scientist Keith Whittington
noted the speed with which commentators had rushed to declare the country on
the brink of a constitutional crisis—even though, as he pointed out, “the
republic appears to have survived these events relatively unscathed.”
Whittington instead proposed thinking about constitutional
crises as “circumstances in which the constitutional order itself is failing.”
In his view, such a crisis could take two forms. There are “operational
crises,” in which constitutional rules don’t tell us how to resolve a political
dispute; and there are “crises of fidelity,” in which the rules do tell us what
to do but aren’t being followed. The latter is probably closest to the common
understanding of constitutional crisis—something along the lines of President
Andrew Jackson’s famous (if apocryphal) rejoinder to the Supreme Court,
“[Justice] John Marshall has made his decision, now let him enforce it.” Or, to
point to an example proposed
recently by Whittington himself, such a crisis would result if
congressional Republicans failed to hold Trump accountable for firing Mueller.
The constitutional scholars Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin
more or less agree with Whittington’s typology, but add a third
category of crisis: situations in which the Constitution fails to constrain
political disputes within the realm of normalcy. In these cases, each party
involved argues that they are acting constitutionally, while their opponent is
not. If examples of the crises described by Whittington are relatively far and
few between—if they exist at all—Levinson and Balkin view crises of
interpretation as comparatively common. One notable example: the battle over
secession that began the Civil War.
These three categorizations help show what a constitutional
crisis could look like, but it’s not entirely clear how they apply to the
situation at hand. Whittington, Levinson and Balkin all agree that the notion
of a constitutional crisis implies some acute episode—a clear tipping point
that tests the legal and constitutional order. But how do we know this
presidency isn’t just an example of the voters picking a terrible leader who
then leads terribly? At what point does a bad president doing bad things become
a problem of constitutional magnitude, let alone a crisis of constitutional
magnitude? Indeed, it’s hard to see a crisis when the sun is still rising every
day on schedule, when nobody appears to be defying court orders or challenging
the authority of the country’s rule-of-law institutions, and when a regularly
scheduled midterm election—in which the president’s party is widely expected to
perform badly—is scheduled for a few months from now. What exactly is the
crisis here?
Another problem with thinking about America’s current woes
as a constitutional crisis involves the question of what comes next. That is,
assume for a moment we are in some kind of constitutional crisis. So what? What
exactly flows from that conclusion? Normally, constitutional conclusions imply
certain prescribed outcomes. When a president is impeached, for example, the
Senate must hold a trial to determine whether he or she should be removed from
office. When serving a second term, a president is not allowed to run for a
third term. But if one concludes that we are going through a constitutional
crisis, what happens next? The label doesn’t carry any obvious implication, let
alone an action item. If it has value, its value is descriptive. It carries
cultural and emotional weight but not much else.
Still another problem with the term is that the duration of
the crisis is not clear. Does a constitutional crisis take place over days,
weeks, or longer? Must it threaten in the immediate term to blow things up if
it doesn’t blow over or get resolved through some other process? (Think of the
Cuban Missile Crisis, only in domestic constitutional terms.) Or can a
constitutional crisis also take place in slow motion?
There’s a better term for what is taking place in America at
this moment: “constitutional
rot.”
Constitutional rot is what happens, the constitutional
scholar John Finn argues, when faith in the key commitments of the Constitution
gradually erode, even when the legal structures remain in place. Constitutional
rot is what happens when decision-makers abide by the empty text of the
Constitution without fidelity to its underlying principles. It’s also what
happens when all this takes place and the public either doesn’t realize—or
doesn’t care.
Balkin used the same phrase immediately after the firing of
James Comey to describe what he saw as “a
degradation of constitutional norms that may operate over long periods of time.”
Comey’s firing was startling, he argued, but not a constitutional crisis in and
of itself. The real constitutional change lay in the slow corruption of public
trust in government that had brought Americans to this point.
Rot, in Finn’s words, is “quiet, insidious, and
subtle.” It hollows out the system without citizens or officials even
noticing. And, as Balkin notes, though “constitutional rot” is distinct from
“constitutional crisis,” the former can lead to the latter. Slowly rotting
floorboards can suddenly give way to the hidden pit beneath. (Balkin uses a
similar metaphor of a rotten tree branch.)
There are clearly elements of rot in our current situation.
The evidence is everywhere. Ongoing violations, or attempted violations, of our
democratic norms and expectations, have become routine. The overt demands for
the politicization of law enforcement have intensified. A highly-politicized
media disseminates presidential propaganda. Congress tolerates it all. This is
consistent with constitutional rot.
But “constitutional rot” also has its limits as a way of
describing Trumpism. Rot, after all, is a one-way street—a process that can be
stemmed and slowed but cannot be reversed. Wood does not regenerate. Rotten
meat does not heal itself and become fresh again.
Yet in different ways, both Balkin and Finn imagine
constitutional rot as potentially reversible. Balkin’s solution is,
essentially, that we must elect different and better leaders in the
future—presumably before it’s too late to replace the floorboards. Finn takes a
different view, making the case that rot can be combated through the
development of an engaged and energized citizenry, one that cares about
preserving and maintaining constitutional values.
Even amid the constitutional degradation of this moment,
both of these rejuvenating mechanisms are very much in evidence. On a daily
basis, features of our democratic culture look more like antibodies fighting
off an illness than like the rot before an inevitable collapse.
Journalists have been relentless and ferocious and effective
in unmasking and reporting the truth—and news institutions have developed more
committed readership as a result. A broad democratic coalition of citizens is
mobilizing against Trumpism—most recently in a Pennsylvania congressional
district believed to be so solidly Republican that Democrats let the incumbent
run unopposed in recent elections. Other institutions, including the very FBI
that Trump is assaulting, are knuckling down and doing their jobs in the face
of pressure. This is not the stuff of a rotting democracy.
Trump can whine and he can fire senior FBI officials, but he
has been singularly ineffective either in getting the bureau to investigate his
political opponents (they have not yet “locked her up”) or in dropping the
Russia investigation, which continues to his apparent endless frustration. If
this is constitutional rot, it's inspiring a surge of public commitment to
underlying democratic ideals—including the independence of law enforcement.
What we are seeing, in other words, is a little more dynamic
than rot, a phrase that assumes we know the outcome. It’s more like constitutional infection
or injury. The wound may indeed lead to a crisis; it may become gangrenous. But
to describe the United States today as facing a constitutional crisis misses
the frenetic pre-crisis activity of the antibodies fighting the bacteria,
alongside the antibiotics the patient is taking.
We are definitely in a period of sustained constitutional
infection. The question is whether we can collectively bring that infection
under control before we face an acute crisis.
To read more CLICK HERE
No comments:
Post a Comment