Marc Levin writes in Real Clear Policy:
Judicial confirmation battles continue to solidify their place in one of the lowest circles of Dante’s Inferno. We have careened from accusations that a religious “dogma” would prevent now Justice Amy Coney Barrett from performing her secular duty to faithfully interpret the law to allegations that Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson would bring a “soft on crime” agenda to the bench.
Fortunately, the Constitution is an unwilling
partner in this descent into purgatory. Our founding document prohibits
religious tests and largely does not prescribe criminal justice policy
outcomes, establishing just one federal crime of treason. Ultimately, whether a
Supreme Court justice takes a strict or more liberal approach to interpreting
the Constitution and our nation’s laws does not reliably predict whether the
outcomes of the cases they decide will make life easier or harder for
defendants.
And while judicial philosophy is fair game for
honest disagreement, the public is not served when some on both sides in recent
confirmation battles let bumper-sticker slogans trivialize complex questions of
justice. At issue now, of course, are claims that Judge Jackson’s sentencing of
some child pornography defendants was outside of the mainstream. Jackson cited
mitigating factors in rejecting this characterization at her confirmation
hearing and conservative legal commentator and former prosecutor, Andrew
McCarthy, has most prominently debunked claims
that Jackson’s sentences of child pornography defendants were beyond the pale,
given that other judges also used their authority to depart below the
guidelines in similar cases.
Though as a general matter second-guessing any trial
court’s discretionary sentences is hardly inappropriate, there is a risk of
confusing debates over such sentences with the separate question of how Judge
Jackson would interpret the Constitution and federal law if confirmed. Judge
Jackson assured
the Senate Judiciary Committee that her judicial philosophy is
grounded in applying the Constitution’s literal text and original intent. This
led Professor Randy Barnett to take a victory
lap for originalism, but many more center-right observers likely agree
with the National Review’s Kevin
Williamson that she would interpret the Constitution and federal law
far more broadly than recent conservatives on the court. However, assuming
Williamson and the conventional wisdom are correct, this may be just as likely
to harm as help criminal defendants. Indeed, in many areas, traditionally
conservative judicial approaches that rely heavily on originalism and strictly
construing provisions work to the advantage of defendants.
Moreover, it is this philosophical inquiry that is
most important going forward given that the Supreme Court’s primary role is not
to second-guess the factual predicate for individual sentences but to decide
much broader questions of constitutional and statutory interpretation that
affect scores of defendants. In making these broad decisions, such as
determining the reach of federal drug and sex offender registration laws, it is
the narrower approaches taken by conservative justices that often stand to
benefit defendants. Furthermore, because federal laws covering the same conduct
such as drug possession are typically harsher than state laws and federal defendants are
much less likely to receive probation than state
defendants, more restrictive interpretations of federal constitutional
powers and federal statutes that are typically associated with conservatives’
jurisprudence, including a reverence for the Tenth Amendment, often work to the
advantage of defendants.
Consider, for example, the 2005 case of Gonzales v. Raich. In
this instance, Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Clarence Thomas, two
staunch conservatives, dissented from the high court’s holding that the
Commerce Clause was so broad as to allow federal drug statutes to effectively
trump California’s medical marijuana law. The liberal majority, by contrast,
concluded that people who medically use the pot grown in their backyard are
somehow connected to the interstate marijuana market. This reasoning construed
the Commerce Clause so broadly that it justified a level of limitless federal
power that would have been foreign to the Founders.
The story is similar when it comes to the court’s
jurisprudence on the sweeping Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act.
In the 2019 case Gundy
v. United States, the majority ruled that the U.S. Attorney General
has the power to retroactively apply this statute to an individual who was
convicted prior to the law’s enactment.
Dissenting conservatives, including Justice Thomas
and Justice Neil Gorsuch, made the more convincing case anchored in the
Constitution’s traditional separation of powers doctrine, under which the
legislative power is expressly reserved for Congress. With the Heritage Foundation
documenting thousands
of federal offenses created through agency rulemaking, a more exacting
approach by the court’s majority to the nondelegation
doctrine is vital to protecting Americans from facing prosecution from
unknowingly violating obscure rules that their democratically elected representatives
never authorized.
These dissenting opinions relating to marijuana and
sex offender registration are important because the narrow approach they take
to the Commerce Clause and the ability of Congress to delegate policymaking to
bureaucracies, respectively, could command majorities on the current, much more
conservative court. This has profound implications not just for many criminal
cases but also for limiting the reach of the federal administrative state in
controversial areas such as environmental
regulation.
Another example of how strictly interpreting the law
can benefit defendants is the late archconservative Justice Antonin Scalia’s
commitment to narrowly construing the wording of criminal laws that lend
themselves to more than one reasonable interpretation, including through
applying the rule of lenity. This rule is not to be confused with leniency, as
it does not relate to the degree of punishment but rather to the question of
whether a statute covers the defendant’s actual conduct. As such, the rule of
lenity is one method of interpreting ambiguous criminal laws wherein ambiguity
is resolved in favor of the defendant. Notably, in her 77-page
response to written questions from the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Judge Jackson indicated she would apply the rule of lenity along with other
methods in interpreting vague criminal statutes.
Justice Scalia and legal scholars have
elucidated several
compelling reasons for this rule that dates
back to at least the 13th century in England, including the importance
of citizens being put on fair notice of what constitutes a crime, which a vague
law by definition fails to do. For instance, dissenting in a 1993 case, Justice
Scalia applied
the rule of lenity in interpreting the word “use” in a federal
firearms statute, finding that it could just as easily be interpreted as to
only cover a defendant who employed a gun in customarily illegal ways as
opposed to also including the defendant who bartered it for drugs.
Conversely, there are areas where a more far-ranging
and purportedly contemporary approach to constitutional interpretation benefits
defendants, particularly when state laws and the severity of punishment are at
issue. For example, liberal judges have been more inclined to find that certain
applications of the death
penalty and juvenile
life without parole sentences constitute cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment. Though the gravity of the outcomes determined by
these cases cannot be doubted, these rulings have little impact on the daily
churn of the criminal justice system, as a total of 11 Americans were executed
in 2021. Moreover, the threshold of “evolving standards
of decency” is itself constrained by trends in practice and public opinion,
meaning that even the decisions striking down the harshest sentences for youths
rely in large measure on such sentences having become increasingly uncommon.
There are genuine and significant differences on how
to interpret the Constitution and criminal statutes, but if a Supreme Court
justice allowed her decisions to be based on whether the outcome was tough or
soft on crime, they would be in dereliction of their duty to rule without fear
or favor to any party. Judicial philosophy is well worth arguing over, but
judicial confirmation battles should not conflate religious litmus tests or
criminal justice policy outcomes with assessing a nominee’s approach to
interpreting the law. Those on either side who make their desire for
pro-defendant or pro-prosecution decisions the test of whether to confirm Judge
Jackson or any nominee are likely to be disappointed in both in the results and
the tenor of the confirmation process.
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